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Abstract:  
 
The world’s biggest Employment Guarantee Programme, India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme (NREGS) has been in operation in rural India since February 2006. In principle, the scheme is a self-
targeted programme designed to provide 100 days of employment to rural households and to serve as a safety 
net. More broadly its aim is to reduce rural poverty through the creation of sustainable rural infrastructure 
which is expected to foster rural economic growth. This study looks at the performance of the NREGS from 
three perspectives - it examines the targeting aspect of the programme, the efficiency of the implementing PRI 
bodies and the impact of the program on various outcomes at household level. The study is based on primary 
data collected from 500 randomly selected households, 2249 individuals and 70 schemes located in 13 Gram 
Panchayats in Birbhum District of West Bengal, India. 
  
On the basis of this primary data, the study reveals that at least in Birbhum District the programme is far more 
likely to be accessed by poorer households (defined in terms of land holding, monthly per-capita income and 
other household related characteristics). At the same time there is a clear and substantial impact of left 
political inclination in terms of enabling access to a greater number of days of work under the scheme. In terms 
of the efficiency impact, the analysis reveals a clear violation of the formal clauses and the spirit of the NREG 
Act and thereby undermining the potential of the programme in terms of providing a safety net. In terms of the 
impact, the study finds no statistically significant impact on economic outcomes at household level but does find 
a statistically significant and substantial relation between reduction of stress related to joblessness  and access 
to the NREGS. The estimates suggest that while the NREGS may not be creating any new employment, and may 
indeed be substituting for existing employment opportunities, the scheme is still considered valuable as it offers 
better working conditions..  
 
 
Key Words: NREGS, Targeting, Efficiency, Impact, labour-substitution, Birbhum, West Bengal  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction:  
The idea of an Employment Guarantee or the government as an employer of last resort (ELR) has been 
used by many governments in different forms starting with the Poor Employment Act of 1817 in 
Britain, New Deal Programmes in USA in the 1930s, Argentina’s Plan Jefes y Jefas, Morocco’s 
Promotion Nationale (since 1961). During last few decades government intervention in the labour 
market as an employer of the last resort has become an integral part of labour market policies in many 
developing countries. Recent examples of the latter include public work programmes in India, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Philippines, Egypt, Botswana, Kenya and Chile (Subbarao, 1997; Lipton, 1996). 
Consistent with this line of thought employment is viewed as the most important area of intervention 
for welfare. (Kaboub 2007:2-3). 
 
While generating employment is important, at the outset, it is necessary to emphasize that in many 
developing economies, a high incidence of rural poverty is found to co-exist with a high rate of 
participation of the rural population in non-farm activities (Saith, 1992:1) and a high incidence of 
‘urban’ poverty also co-exists with a high rate of participation in the urban informal sector. Hence, it 
cannot be argued that unemployment is the only reason for impoverishment. On one hand, private 
sector investment has not been able to absorb the surplus labour resulting in growing unemployment; 
on the other hand, existing absorption in the informal sector and rural non-farm sector does not ensure 
the minimum income needed to eradicate poverty. Thus, ‘the dichotomy between policies that target 
“only income” or “only employment” is no longer constructive. An effective safety net must provide a 
guaranteed source of income through a guaranteed source of work opportunities in meaningful, life-
enhancing activities’ (Tcherneva, 2007: 25).  
Amongst public work programmes in developing countries, no public work programme has been 
studied as thoroughly as the Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) in the State of Maharashtra, India 
(Basu, 2007:1). In the fore of that development, in India, an ambitious National Rural Employment 
Scheme (NREGS) came into force in February 2006. The scheme is based on the National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA1) which was passed by the Indian parliament in September 2005. 
This new scheme has renewed interest in evaluating the effectiveness of such welfare through 
                                                 
1 NREGA- National Rural Guarantee Act which is followed by a Programme called National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Programme (NREGP) which is again followed by the Scheme called National Rural Employment Guarantee Schemes 
(NREGS). 
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workfare programmes in terms of providing an economic safety net to the rural poor. Since the scheme 
has been established relatively recently, there is little research that has been conducted on its 
effectiveness in terms of meeting its stated goals. This paper examines three issues. First, the paper 
examines the targeting performance of the program, second, the efficiency of the implementing 
institution and finally the impact of the programme on various outcomes. The analysis is at the 
household (HH) level and relies on data collected from 500 households located in Birbhum District of 
West Bengal, India. 
 
1.1. Contextual background and relevance of the research work 
1.1.1 Indian Poverty debate and NREGA 
If India’s official poverty line of a monthly per capita consumption of 356 rupees or 9 USD in rural 
and 593 rupees in urban areas is taken as a benchmark, then 300 million Indians are officially poor. In 
absolute numbers this is not much lower than the figures thirty years ago, yet the share of the poor as a 
percent of the population has steadily dropped from 55% in the early seventies to 28% in 2005. 
However, the unchangeable factor is the deep-rootedness of poverty in rural areas where three-quarters 
of the poor live (Indian Planning Commission, 2008a). 
 
The main reason for the vast poverty in rural areas lies in the continued economic dependence on 
agriculture. Of the rural poor, 41% are informal agricultural laborers and 22% are self-employed 
farmers. This also affects urban poverty as most poor households in the cities are distressed migrants 
from rural areas with stagnating farming incomes (Planning Commission, 2008b). Today, agriculture 
absorbs 52% of India’s labor force but contributes less than one fifth to the country’s GDP (Ravi & 
Engler 2009:7). The overwhelming dependence on a sector where productivity continues to fall behind 
the rest of the economy contributes to growing inequality between rural and urban areas 
The main reason for low agricultural productivity lies in excess of (underemployed) farming labor. 
Despite unprecedented growth rates of almost 9% in recent years (since 2003 onwards), the 
manufacturing sector has not generated enough employment opportunities to absorb the 
underemployed workforce and its share in total employment is still lower than 20% (Ministry of 
Finance, 2008). Meanwhile, the creation of new jobs in the agricultural sector has slowed down 
considerably, from 1.8% annually between 1983 and 1994 to 0.4% between 1994 and 2005 (Planning 
Commission, 2008b). 
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As the workforce continues to grow, the earning situation becomes more acute not only for the 
landless, who always lacked the possibility of subsistence farming, but gets worse also for those 
owning land. Their available land plots decrease from generation to generation and the share of 
landowning farmers holding less than 1 hectare of land has risen from 56% in 1982 to 70% today 
(Planning Commission, 2008b). As a consequence, landowners, in order to supplement their incomes, 
have increasingly joined the landless in seeking wage labor. Since the low-skilled are widely barred 
from the formal sector (which accounts for only 14% of total employment), this intensifies the 
competition for informal jobs, thereby weakening the bargaining power of job seekers and abetting 
precarious employment without steady and reliable income flows or basic labor protection. 
 
Against this background, the NREGP appears to be a promising policy for poverty alleviation through 
“workfare” approach. Since its initial launch in 200 districts in February 2006, the scheme has spread 
country wide and now operates in 596 of India’s 625 districts. The scheme has created work 
opportunities for over 66.2 million households in the financial year 2008-09 (NREGA official website: 
http://nrega.nic.in/netnrega/MISreport.aspx?fin_year=2008-2009). The scheme may be classified as a self-
targeted workfare programme and based on the available statistics it is the world’s largest self-
targeting programme. In terms of financial outlay the programme had an annual budget of USD 5 
billion over the last 3 years and in 2009-10 the budget outlay is USD 7.8 billion. It has been hailed by 
Amartya Sen as, “a unique event in the pro-poor strategies in the world, as no country in the world has 
ever given a right (a constitutionally obligatory mandate!) of this kind to such a large section of the 
population” (cited in Hirway, 2007:7).  The following section provides some more details on the 
programme. 
 
1.1.2 Employment Guarantee Scheme and NREGA  
The basic features of the Indian NREGA is similar to other Employment Guarantee Programmes (see 
Tcherneva, 2003:2-3 for details). The act envisages the provision of: 
i. Federally funded jobs to anyone who is ready, willing and able to work. 
ii. These jobs claim to provide a living wage and decent working conditions  
All such programmes try to tackle poverty which is experienced by those whose income deprivation 
and social exclusion is primarily due to joblessness. Moreover, any such strategy is though primarily 
designed to tackle poverty but is not a “targeted” social protection programme for the poor. These are 
designed to provide universal “guarantee” of employment. Besides fulfilling availability of guaranteed 
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unskilled manual work on piece-rate basis on demand, the employment guarantee programmes also 
satisfy the following conditions: 
i. The work which is chosen is labour intensive in nature 
ii. After completion of the work under the scheme a productive asset is supposed to be generated. 
In EGP, government provides the job opportunity with assurance of minimum wage. But whether to 
participate or not is decided by the beneficiaries themselves. That is why this is a self targeting 
programme & this option of self targeting is universal. Like all other poverty alleviation programmes, 
EGP has also a focus towards reduction of poverty. So the task of the policy maker is to design the 
outline of the programme and set the self-selection criterion for the potential beneficiaries. But this 
outline will be such that non-poor will not find any incentive to participate in a self-targeting manner 
and thereby ensuring the programme as a poverty alleviation programme. In EGP, the “minimum 
wage rate”, “unskilled manual labour work”, “piece-rate” – all these are designed in such a way that 
non-poor will supposedly find dis-incentive with these kinds of arrangements. Hence, these 
programmes are ‘universal de jure, but targeting de facto’ (Imai 2007:4).  
At the moment, such types of EGP are operating in many parts of the world as mentioned in the 
introduction.  More specifically, as far as the Indian programme is concerned, the formal Act states 
that it is: 
 
An Act to provide for the enhancement of livelihood security of the households in rural areas of the 
country by providing at least one hundred days of guaranteed wage employment in every financial 
year to every household whose adult members volunteer to do unskilled  manual work and for matters 
connected therewith or incidental thereto.   
 
The formal goals of the act are: 
1. Strong social safety net for the vulnerable groups by providing a fall-back employment source, 
when other employment alternatives are scarce or inadequate. 
2. Growth engine for sustainable development of an agricultural economy. Through the process of 
providing employment on works that address causes of chronic poverty such as drought, 
deforestation and soil erosion, the Act seeks to strengthen the natural resource base of rural 
livelihood and create durable assets in rural areas. Effectively implemented, NREGA has the 
potential to transform the geography of poverty. 
3. Empowerment of rural poor through the processes of a rights-based Law. 
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Salient Features of NREGA: 
1. Adult members of a rural household, willing to do unskilled manual work, may apply for    
registration in writing or orally to the local Gram Panchayat (The Rural Local Self Government). 
2. Employment will be given within 15 days of application for work, if it is not then daily 
unemployment allowance as per the Act, has to be paid. Liability of payment of unemployment 
allowance is of the States. 
3. Work should ordinarily be provided within 5 km radius of the village. In case work is provided 
beyond 5 km, extra wages of 10% are payable to meet additional transportation and living 
expenses. 
4.   Wages are to be paid according to piece rate or daily rate. Disbursement of wages has to be 
done on weekly basis and not beyond a fortnight in any case. 
5.  At least one-third beneficiaries shall be women who have registered and requested work under 
the scheme.  
6.  Work site facilities such as crèche, drinking water, shade have to be provided. 
7.  Permissible works predominantly include water and soil conservation, afforestation and land 
development works 
8. A 60:40 wage and material ratio has to be maintained.  
9. Social Audit has to be done by the Gram Sabha. 
10. Grievance redressal mechanisms have to be put in place for ensuring a responsive 
implementation process. 
11. All accounts and records relating to the Scheme should be available for public scrutiny. 
 
‘Thus, NREGA fosters conditions for inclusive growth ranging from basic wage security and 
recharging rural economy to a transformative empowerment process of democracy.’ (NREGA 
operational Guide line-2008 3rd ed.) By providing readily available employment –the program aims to 
put households in a better position to keep up a basic income flow when no other source of earning is 
available. Given the great destitution of many households, such immediate support might often boil 
down to mere survival aid. In addition, the NREGS also counteracts in-work poverty and 
powerlessness among the privately employed as, by intensifying the competition for casual laborers, it 
increases the pressure on employers to improve their terms of employment in the open market. 
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1.1.3 Where does West Bengal Lie?  
 
In tune of this highly ambitious programme it may now be examined how the state of West Bengal, a 
so called backward state in India, could fit in the context of its backwardness. In comparison with the 
other states of India, in terms of per-capita state domestic product (SDP), West Bengal had been the 
richest state in India in 1960, but by the end of last millennium, the SDP per-capita rank of the state 
declined to 9. At the time of independence (1947) the share of the state in the total industrial 
production of the country had been 24%. But it is evident from the recent estimates that this share has 
reached 4.6% which places it at the bottom cluster among the 17 big states (Economic Census 2005). 
In spite of registering good performance in agriculture in the past, in recent years, the agricultural 
growth rate has also declined along with a sharp fall in productivity. In terms of the latest Human 
development report (2005), West Bengal is placed 10th place among 17 major states of India. 
Compounding this situation, for small peasants, agriculture is now becoming un-remunerative and 
sizable section of the rural workforce is being pushed out from agriculture. At the same time, small 
enterprises are hardly able to absorb the surplus labour even when the wage rate remains depressed. 
Although work participation in West Bengal has increased between 1991 to 2001, this is largely 
accounted for by an increase in the marginal workforce (Table -1) coupled with a fall in the main 
workforce from 51.18 % in 1991 to 46% in 2001. This trend is declining even more in recent times 
unlike the other big states like Kerala, Maharashtra, Tamilnadu etc. (Economic census 2005). So rise 
in work participation with significant fall in main workforce percentage implies that new jobs must 
have been created mostly outside the organized sector of the economy and there by creating greater 
vulnerability for the workforce as a whole. The dismal performance in the non-farming enterprise 
sector (both rural and urban Table-2), relatively higher contribution of primary sector in the Gross 
SDP (as compared to similar states, fig-1) and the decline in growth and productivity of this sector, 
displays the vulnerable status of the workforce in terms of livelihood and employability.  
Table-1 Marginal worker as a ratio of main worker (%) 
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Table-2 Average annual Growth in employment in enterprises other than crop production and 
plantation (1998-2005) in percentage 
 
 
 
Figure-1  
 
Source: Central Statistical Organization (CSO): 2006  
 
Against this backdrop, NREGP has also been introduced in West Bengal in 2006 with a great deal of optimism 
and expectation. However, the performance of the state in terms of the Govt. of India administrative report 
seems a bit gloomy for the last three years. In the 1st year (2006-07) West Bengal provided an average 14 
person days of jobs (to those who have registered and demanded jobs) as against the national average of 43 
person days. In the 2nd year (2007-08) the figure improved to 25 person days as against a national average of 42 
person days. The trend continued in the 3rd year (2008-09) and the state average was around 26 person days as 
against a national average of 47.53 person days.  
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Table 3: State wise average person-days generated.             Figure-2: State wise no. of HH covered (08-09)   
Compa r a t i v e  pe r f oma nc e  of  t he  bi g st a t e s unde r  
NREGP  i n t e r ms of  numbe r  of  house hol d pr ov i de d 
wi t h j obs-  Ye a r  2 0 0 8 - 0 9
162932
199166
298741
445713
549022
692015
850691
896212
906297
1576348
1877393
3025854
3345648
3822484
4336466
5207665
5699557
6373093
0 200000
0
400000
0
600000
0
800000
0
states 
5
 
Source: data compiled from the Official website of the nrega: 
http://nrega.nic.in/writereaddata/mpr_out/empgenst_12_N_0809.html accessed on 16.09.2009 at 10.30 pm IST  
 
Table-3 provides a comparative performance of the big Indian states in terms of number of person 
days provided on average as against demand for job under NREGS and West Bengal consistently 
performs amongst the bottom 5. On the other hand if we look at the figure-2, it tells us that West 
Bengal’s performance places it amongst the top 10 in terms of reaching out to household through the 
NREGS.  With this background following sub-section states the objectives of this study. 
 
Average Person days generated 
Name of the State 
2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 
Rajasthan 
 85 77.33 75.75 
Assam 
 72.31 34.76 34.85 
Madhyapradesh 
 68.79 63.33 56.59 
Tripura 
 67.44 42.73 63.94 
Himachal Pradesh 
 48.52 35.98 45.24 
Haryana 
 47.52 50.46 40.23 
Gujrat 
 44.41 30.98 25.05 
Maharashtra 
 41.38 38.94 46.25 
Karnataka 
 40.32 37.33 31.73 
Jharkhand 
 37.33 44.5 47.56 
Bihar 
 35.34 22.16 25.95 
Uttarpradesh 
 31.98 33.27 52.37 
Andhra Pradesh 
 31.4 41.85 47.99 
Uttarakhand 
 30.23 42.45 34.92 
Tamilnadu 
 26.74 52.25 35.97 
Jammu & Kasmir 
 26.62 24.15 36.76 
Kerala 
 20.67 32.77 22.01 
West Bengal 14.27 25.21 26.00 
National average 
 43.01 42.35 47.53 
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1.2 Research Objectives  
While the intrinsic worth of using work requirements to transfer  benefits to the most needy is widely 
recognized (Haddad and Adato, 2001), successive reports produced by internal government auditing 
agencies (Comptroller and Auditors General, Govt. of India 2007, 2008) and external social audits by 
many independent agencies reveal that the usefulness of the NREGS is not uncontested. There are 
doubts over whether the self-targeting mechanism of the NREGS is more successful as compared to 
targeted workfare programme. In addition there are concerns about the efficiency of the programme 
implementing govt. institution (i.e. Panchayati Raj Institution- PRI). Finally, there are apprehensions 
about whether there are any perceptible changes in terms of poverty and vulnerability status of the 
participating households (Planning Commission, 2008a). Motivated by these concerns, my research 
paper deals with three issues.  
 
Since NREGS falls in the category of self targeted programmes, my first objective in this paper is to 
analyse the targeting aspect of the programme i.e. who is accessing NREGS and what are the major 
determinants of participation in the NREGS. I would examine these issues by using household level 
primary data on participation in the NREGS and the number of days worked under this scheme.  
 
The second objective of my paper is to verify the efficiency of the PRI institutions involved in 
implementing the programme. More precisely I would focus on the Gram Panchayat (GP). I have 
made use of 70 case studies from the field to throw light on the debate of institutional efficiency. Here 
I have used a rather restrictive definition of efficiency and I examine whether the GPs are able to 
ensure payment of wages to labourer in due time after their work as mentioned in the act.  
 
The Third and final objective is to examine whether there is any impact of the programme on various 
outcomes of interest. In particular, I have observed the impact of the programme on household 
consumption, income, savings, debt and reduction of stress or anxiety level related to joblessness. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the sampling process, the 
questionnaire and the sample. The conceptual framework of employment guarantee, the debates and 
the specific approach of this study is discussed in chapter-3. Results and findings are analysed in 
chapter 4. Chapter 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.  
 
 21
Chapter 2 
 
Sampling process, questionnaire and the Sample 
To meet the paper’s research objectives, a household survey was canvassed in the months of July and 
August 2009 in Birbhum district. The major focus of this survey was to gather data on the functioning 
of the NREGS and to gather information on household livelihoods, income, expenditure, savings, 
indebtedness, livestock and other socio-economic variables. Prior to discussing the estimation 
approach and research findings, this section introduces the sampling process and approach used to 
gather the primary data for in this study.  
 
2.1. Sampling process  
The paper is based on a sample of 500 households and 2249 individuals drawn from 13 Gram 
Panchayats (the lowest tier of Rural Local Self Government) located in Birbhum district of West 
Bengal, India. While the choice of the district was driven by pragmatic concerns, the sampling 
approach within the district was designed to yield a sample which is representative at the district level. 
First, Gram Panchayats (GP) were chosen on the basis of a stratified sampling procedure and 
thereafter within each strata households were chosen on the basis of random sampling.  
 
In the first stage, all GP of Birbhum district were stratified into different clusters according to their degrees 
of backwardness. The following indicators have been used for measuring backwardness, all of which are 
available at the GP level from existing data bases: (1) No. of ‘backward village’2 within that GP (2) No. of 
Below Poverty Line Household (as per Rural Household Survey-2005) within that GP  and (3) average 
score away from 100 in the ‘self-evaluation’3 exercise (for 2006-07 & 2007-08) . I then stratified the entire 
GPs of district into cluster of GP as measured by these indicators according to the following procedure. 
Denoting by kjQ  , the k-th indicator for the j-th GP, we find the index of backwardness in the j-th GP in 
the district by the following formula 
 
 ( ) 3
1
321
3 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++=
jjj QQQBj  ……………………………………………. (1) 
                                                 
2 See Glossary-1  
3 See Glossary-2 
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Instead of a linear index, we employ the above so as to take care of any skewness that may be present. This 
is a formula followed by UNDP in its Human Development Report.4 
Denoting by Bmin = Min (B
j
) and Bmax = Min (B
j
), we can calculate the score of the j-th GP (S
j
) by the 
following formula:  
 ( )
( )⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−=
minmax
min
BB
BB
Sj j  x100 i.e. backwardness score for j= 1, 2, ………167(i.e. the no. of GP in 
Birbhum). maxB = maximum among jB  and minB = minimum among jB  & 1000 ≤≤ Sj  as Sj  
increases implies backwardness score also increases and the concerned GP is more backward. 
 
In this way, we assign a score for each GP within a [0, 100] interval. In effect, we can assign a rank for 
each GP within Birbhum district. Let this rank be denoted be R
j 
for j =1,2,…….,167.  
 
 
In the next step, three clusters of GPs were considered namely most advanced cluster, moderately 
advanced and backward cluster depending upon the backwardness score. This analysis showed that that 
13.48% of the district’s total households were in the most advanced cluster, 36.97% of households were in 
the moderately advanced cluster and 49.55 % of the households live in backward clusters. Accordingly I 
chose 13.48% i.e. 67 households for my sample from the cluster of advanced GP, 36.97% i.e. 185 
households from moderately advanced GP and and 49.55% i.e. 248 households from backward GP. In 
terms of GPs, 2 (Rupuspur and Bajitpur) were selected from the most advanced cluster, 4 GPs (namely 
Horisara, Kundala, Panrui & Bahiri-Panchshowa) were selected from moderately advanced cluster and 7 
GPs (Ulkunda, Mallarpur-II, Parulia, Barrah, Gonpur, Joudev-Kenduli & Khoyrasole) were selected from 
the backward cluster. Households within GP were randomly selected.  
 
2.2 The questionnaire: 
The questionnaire  used during field survey was comprehensive in the sense that it comprised the 
following blocks of information. 
 
1. Block: 1- Descriptive identification of sample household 
2. Block: 2- Specific identification of the sample household 
3. Block :3 – Household assets (includes land, livestock, house, durables etc.) and income  
4. Block : 4- Indebtedness and savings situation of the household 
                                                 
4 See Human Development Report, 1997, Technical note 1, pp. 117 to 125 which is actually based on a background paper 
by Sudhir Anand and Amartya K. Sen, “Concepts of Human Development and Poverty: A Multidimensional Perspective”. 
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5. Block: 5- Occupation and other particulars of the all household members. 
6. Block: 6- Household consumption expenditure. 
7. Block: 7- Household level information on NREGP. 
 
One month and one year recall period were used separately for collecting data pertaining to income 
and expenditure. But for employment and labour market related information I used one year and three 
years time series recall period separately and also asked for information for the entire period and for 
lean periods. As discussed previously the data collected here are representative at the Birbhum District 
level but not at the state and national level.  
 
 
2.3 Sample: 
The main objective behind such rigorous sampling process for household selection was to ensure a 
robust representative sample from the district as far as possible so that findings on account of the 
NREGP could be placed at the policy advocacy level. In this sub-section an attempt is made to 
compare descriptive statistics from my sample with descriptive statistics based on secondary data at 
the district level.  
 
 
Glimpses about sample vis-à-vis Birbhum District: 
Birbhum District is situated in the Western part of West Bengal. It has 19 administrative Blocks and 
167 Gram Panchayats. As per 2001 census of India, it accounts for 5.12% of land area of the state and 
3.76 % of the state’s total population. Hence this district has lower density of population (663 in per-
square kilometer) as compared to the state (903 in per-square kilometer). 
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Table-4A: Sample vis-à-vis District- Compatibility of few important parameter 
% of Work Participation 
(†) 
Level % of 
Rural 
Male (†) 
% of 
Rural 
female 
(†) 
Sex 
Ratio 
(†) 
Dependen
cy Ratio 
(†) Male  Female Total 
Average 
family 
size(†) 
% of 
HH  
With 
zero 
holding 
(¡) 
% of 
BPL 
HH 
(¡) 
Houseless 
or kuccha 
(thatched 
shack)  (¡) 
District 51.29 48.7 950 1.70 54 20 37.4 4.6 57 42.3 63.8 % 
Sample 50.69 49.31 972 1.745 62.2 21.1 41.95 4.5 40.4 43.51 63.8% 
Source: District Human Development Report Birbhum-2008 and calculation from sample survey by author. 
 
Table-4B: Sample vis-à-vis District- Compatibility of few important parameter 
Literate in percentage (†) Level % of 
population 
having one 
or less than 
one meal in 
a day (¡)  
Average 
monthly per-
capita 
consumption 
expenditure  
(in Rs.) 
Average 
monthly per-
capita 
income      
(in Rs.) 
Female 
Headed 
Househ
old 
(in %) 
male female total 
%of Marginal 
holding (i.e. 
land holding 
less than 1 
Hc or 2.471 
acre) (¡) 
Land 
less 
(land 
owned< 
0.0049 
acre)(¡) 
Averag
e 
holding
(¡) 
District 4.7 569(*) 570(#) 17.6 70.89 51.55 61.48 92.06 6.2 0.73 
acre 
Sample 2.7 528.1 (**) 640.13(+) 11.6 76.14 65.01 70.65 90.2 9.8 0.87 
acre 
Source: District Human Development Report Birbhum-2008 and calculation from sample survey by author. 
 
Note: (†) figure at the district level for this categories represent for 2001 i.e. based on last census of India. 
          (¡) figure at the district level for this categories represent for 2005 i.e. based on Rural Household survey-2005 for WB          
          (*) as per West Bengal State Human Development Report-2004 & (*), (**) both are at 99-00 prices (base 86-87=100),  
          (#) as per District Human Development report -2008,  
          (+) at 99-00 prices (base 86-87=100) 
 
The tables above, 4A and 4B, show that based on certain indicators viz. land holding, family size, 
percentage of work participation, sex composition of population, dependency ratio, % of BPL 
household, literacy rate the data collected through survey represents certain degree of comparability 
with the district level findings from different secondary sources. However, it is to be noted that these 
secondary sources are representing a wide period of time span starting from 2001 to 2008. Still above 
tables are showing a nature of representativeness of primary surveyed data in respect of the Birbhum 
District. Considering this one could argue that findings from this study may be advocated at the policy 
plane at least at the district level.   
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Chapter 3: 
 
Conceptual Framework: Employment Guarantee, the debate and approach of the study  
 
3.1 Introduction:  
 
In an Employment Guarantee Programme (EGP), a government provides a job opportunity with 
assurance of minimum wage. However, the decision to participate or not is decided by individuals. 
Accordingly, such programs are self targeted programmes and hence these schemes are ‘based on self-
regulatory tests that only the truly poor would pass’ (Besley & Kanbur, 1993:78). In principle, in such 
schemes, the targeting costs are zero, though administrative costs other than identifying and counting 
the poor may still be large. In contrast, in the case of targeted interventions, governments specify the 
beneficiaries and administrative costs may be quite larger.   
 
In the case of self-targeted EGP programmes, the task of the policy maker is to design the programme 
and set the self-selection criterion such that non-poor will not find any incentive to participate and 
thereby ensure that the programme serves as a poverty alleviation programme. While such self-
targeted approaches have benefits, there are also potential concerns. For example, if we take into 
account the indirect effects of such type of programme then one could argue that since EGP effectively 
imposes a minimum wage rate it may lead to distortions in the labour markets and may promote 
displacement of labour from private farm and non-farm sector to the government sector, specially if 
such minimum wages are higher than the market rate. In the recent World Development Report 
(2009:163), NREGS has been criticized on the grounds of creating high disincentive in the form of 
restricting the gains from rural labourer’s mobility. Additionally, in an empirical paper on Argentina’s 
self targeted programme Plan Jefes, it has been shown that individuals who enter the programme are 
far less likely to exit to employment, meaning reliance on the programme may reduce the incentive to 
search for work and in the long-run may damage individual employability and perpetuate poverty 
(Iturriza, Bedi, Sparrow, 2008:4-5) 
 
With this background on the pros and cons of self-targeted EGP and consistent with the research 
objectives of this paper, this section  reviews the existing debate in the literature centering on 
‘targeting’ ‘efficacy of PRI institution’ and ‘impact’ of EGS and more specifically NREGS. While 
doing so it elaborates on the methodology used to investigate the three issues under scrutiny. 
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 3.2 Issue of Targeting  
3.2.1 A review of the debate. 
Several empirical papers have investigated the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Programme 
(Hirway, 2004:5122; Ravallion,1991:155-156, Gaiha, 2003:3) and Morocco’s Promotion Nationale 
(Jalal 2007:9-10). These studies reveal that these programmes have not faced a financial crunch, 
however, operational sustainability and the institutional capacity to run the programme along with 
reaching the targeted population are issues that arise. While, theoretically, jobs are guaranteed on 
demand, the speed with which these are made available varies widely. EGP operations face major 
challenge with the cyclical fluctuation of participation in the programme with the maintenance of 
buffer stock of jobs for the lean season. In most of the cases such institutional arrangements are highly 
inadequate. In terms of the outreach of the programmes there are two types of mistakes: ‘E’ mistake, 
i.e., excessive coverage of the non-poor which occurs when the intervention reaches a non-targeted 
population. Another type is ‘F’ mistake, i.e., failure to reach the underlying targeted population, 
precisely the poor people in this context.  Empirical studies have also shown that in one of the oldest 
EGP Programme in Maharashtra, India, the share of the poor among EGP decreased over the years and 
attracted many non-poor over time (Gaiha 1996a, 1996b, 1997, 2000:206-208). Among many reasons 
organizational inflexibility, rigid nature of bureaucracy, excessive burden of utilization of federal 
allotment of funds are the main reasons for these errors. Identity based social exclusion and inclusion 
sometimes plays crucial roles in respect of ‘E’ & ‘F’ mistakes.  
Beside those factors discussed above one of the major determinants or influential factor for accessing 
such kind of employment programme are the political inclination and the patron-clientelistic relation 
between the scheme participant and the local politicians. Gaiha (1997:304-305) pointed out the 
possibility that the poor without political support are excluded from the project. Similarly, Giraudy’s 
(2007:38-39,52) study on different emergency employment programmes in Argentina between 1993 to 
2002 claimed that politicians are able to access funds from the federal government, which are then 
used to buy political loyalties from voters and legislators. More interestingly this study has shown that 
not all political parties are equally suited to deliver public good in a clientelistic way because not all 
parties have equal access to the fiscal resources that allow politicians to deliver the employment 
programme clientelistically. Giraudy claimed that “there is wide agreement among scholars studying 
Argentine politics that poor and low-skilled voters are more susceptible to being turned into political 
clients than higher income/skilled voters” (Giraudy:2007:39). In a more deep rooted study based on 
the Maharashtra EGS, Patel (2006:5131-32) investigated the variety of ways in which the political 
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mobilisation of the oppressed could have take place and simultaneously examined the manipulations 
by the ruling Maratha, (the people of Maharashtra) landed caste to disempower and eventually co-opt 
such struggles in order to perpetuate its own political dominance in Maratha politics. In the context of 
my study area, i.e., West Bengal, where for the last 32 years a left ruling government is in operation, a 
very recent study by Bardhan et al. (2009:48-49,52,55-56) commented on the nature of democracy and 
clientelism behind such extraordinary political stability. Based on data from 2,400 rural households 
drawn from 85 villages in West Bengal this study shows that there is a strong existence of clientelistic 
relations between beneficiaries and the left ruled village panchayats when government’s benefits are 
of a recurring nature. The NREGS is a recurring type of programme and it is possible that access to 
this program will also be influenced by the existing clientelistic patterns in the state.  
 
In a recent paper on the performance of the NREGS in various states, Jha et al. (2009) point out that in 
spite of performing quite well in terms of administrative performance indicators (i.e. providing larger 
number of days of work to the job seekers) there is considerable participation of the non-poor (defined 
in terms of land holding and PDS5 less participation). In related literature Lanjouw and Ravallion 
(1999:258-259), Alderman (2002:385,392,397), Ravallion (2000:337-339), Gaiha (2000a:210-211), 
Galasso and Ravallion (2005:719-723) and others empirically evaluate the higher chance of 
participation of non-poor and the issue of targeting in general in the context of self-targeted 
programmes. The findings are inconclusive as most of these authors note that targeting effectiveness is 
context specific and varies widely across programs, efficacy of the concerned government institution, 
levels of government, counties and regions. More interestingly Ravallion and Lanjouw also analyze 
the timing of programme capture and find that non-poor enjoy the majority of the benefit early on but 
the share of benefits to the poor increases over time. As already mentioned, in contrast, Gaiha 
(2000a:210-211) observes the opposite findings in the case of Employment Guarantee Scheme in the 
Indian State of Maharashtra where over time the programme experienced higher participation by the 
non-poor especially because of a sharp hike in the wage rate.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 PDS- Public Distribution System 
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3.2.2 The approach of this study 
To analyze the issue of targeting, I examine the link between various variables that capture household 
wealth and income with i) whether households are participating in the NREGS and ii) the number of 
employment days obtained through the NREGS.   
First, I propose to estimate the following binary response model assuming a standard normal 
distribution of my response variable NREGSi. This is written as,  
 
iii
adj
ii XrhsscorempcelanholdNREGSi εθβββα +++++= 321 ……………………………… (2) 
 
Where NREGSi =1 if household i  is participant in NREGS and 0 otherwise, ilanhold  is total land 
holdings of the household i measured in acres, adjimpce   is the monthly per-capita consumption 
expenditure adjusted after deducting the monthly per-capita income from NREGS, irhsscore  =1 if the 
household is a BPL and 0 otherwise, iX  is vector of all other determinants of participation in NREGS 
including number of cattle, religion, sex of head of household, household size, social group, religion, 
location proximity and variables showing political participation of the household and iε  is the random 
error term. The impact of changes in the independent variables on the probability of NREGS 
participation is estimated by assuming a standard normal distribution. The coefficients 1β , 2β , 3β  
indicate the impact of a change in the corresponding independent variable on the probability of 
participation in NREGS. I am interested in finding out the sign of the coefficient first and then the 
magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficients. If 1β & 2β <0 then participation in NREGS 
declines with size of land holdings and monthly per-capita income and consistent with the self-
targeted design of the programme suggests that households with larger land holding and higher 
incomes are less likely to access the programme.  
Going beyond the binary response model, I also use a censored regression (Tobit) model to estimate 
the link between the number of days of work and variables capturing various household characteristics. 
Based on the same specification (2) I run a Tobit model regression where NREGSi  is now treated as a 
censored variable (censored at 0) showing no. of days worked under NREGS since inception. These 
estimates will provide the marginal effects of various characteristics on the number of days accessed 
through the NREGS. 
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3.3 Issue of efficiency of PRI 
3.3.1 A review of the debate. 
At the drafting stage of the NREGA itself, the role of the GPs has been highlighted. The NREGS is 
designed as a program with a decentralized structure with GPs endowed with the power and authority 
to plan and implement the scheme with the active participation of the local people. The GPs are also 
accountable to their communities for the performance of the scheme (Vaidhyanathan, 2005:1586-87).  
Research on the efficiency and ability of the GPs to fulfill their requirements is still at an incipient 
stage. Bela Bhatia and Jean Dreze (2006:3201) revealed that there are great lacunae in the institutional 
set up of the programme. They find that there is little difference between NREGA and the earlier 
employment programmes as National Food For Work Programme (NFFWP), Sampoorna Grameen 
Rojgar Yojona (SGRY) and the basic purpose of providing employment on demand at the statutory 
minimum wage is not close to being achieved. The study of PRIA6, India (2008:8) stresses on the 
capacity building aspect of the programme implementing government institution i.e. precisely the 
Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRI) for the smooth and proper functioning of the NREGS. A study by the 
Planning Commission, India (2008c:10-11) also reveals that the programme implementing institutions 
(PRI bodies) are not able to provide employment on demand and on time. A majority of the 
households (82% in their large sample) expressed that they did not get work within the stipulated 15 
days nor were they paid any unemployment allowances. Moreover, wage payments through bank or 
post office do not take place within a fortnight as enumerated in the guidelines.  
3.3.2 The approach of this study. 
Here I narrowly define efficiency in the sense of whether implementing government institutions (the 
Panchayati Raj Institution i.e. here GPs) are able to deliver a job and make the subsequent wage 
payments within the statutory 15 day limit as outlined in the NREG Act-2005). The main aim is to 
identify the time lag in terms of days between the date of start of work and the date on which payment 
is made. To trace this lag I analysed 70 individual schemes (representative no. of schemes from 2006-
07 to 2009-10) located in 7 randomly selected Gram Panchayats in Birbhum. In addition, I examined 
whether jobs are created during the lean season. I analysed district monthly expenditure data on 
NREGS for last 3 financial years and studied whether there is an increase in expenditure during mid 
August to November as these are typically the lean periods in this area. To fulfill its role as a safety 
                                                 
6 PRIA- Participatory Rural Initiative in Asia, an international NGO working on PRI issues, participation, decentralization. 
They recently published National Study Phase-II- the Role of Panchayati Raj Institution in implementing NREGA-2008 
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net it is expected that the programme should deliver better coverage both in money and person-days 
during this period.  
3.4 Issue of Impact 
3.4.1 A review of the debate 
Apart from the targeting aspect there is also a live debate on the short and long run impact of such 
programs. While there is large literature on the impact of such programs, specific papers that deal with 
the NREGS are limited. However, a recent paper by Ravi and Engler (2009) uses panel data from 
Andhra Pradesh to measure the impact of the NREGS on participating households in terms of food 
security, probability of holding savings, anxiety level among low income households and non-food 
expenses. Across all these outcomes the authors find a positive and statistically significant impact. The 
key challenge in terms of isolating impact as noted by Ravi and Engler (2009:12) is that simple 
participant-nonparticipant comparison of outcome to assess the impact lead to bias-prone results. 
Ravallion and Datt (1995) pointed out that if the programme did not exist, workfare participants would 
not just be idle, but realize some income including output from subsistence production. Therefore the 
outcomes of interest of participants have to be corrected by foregone outcome (Ravallion and Datt, 
1995:415; Haddad and Adato, 2001:3-5) or the performance of the participants has to be compared 
with that of similar group of non-participants (Jalan and Ravallion, 1999:4-10; Galasso and Ravallion, 
2004:369).  
3.4.2 The approach of this study 
Since this NREGS is a self targeted workfare programme with differential disincentive (like unskilled 
manual labour work, unskilled piece rate of work, lesser coverage of other decent work environment 
etc.) for the non-poor, it is likely that households with lower income profile or economic prosperity 
will be more likely to participate. Accordingly, simple comparisons between participants and non-
participants will not be a useful empirical strategy as economic outcomes such as consumption 
expenditure (and hence savings or loan) or income and number of days worked under NREGS will be 
simultaneously determined. Under such circumstances relying on OLS will lead to inconsistent and 
misleading estimates of the effect of the programme on outcomes.  
 
To account for the simultaneous relation between household economic status and the number of days 
worked under the NREGS I turn to Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation techniques. The basic idea is 
to find variables which exert a strong influence on the number of days worked under the NREGS 
scheme but which do not have a direct effect on the outcome of interest.  While the main challenge is 
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to find suitable instruments, an issue to which I will return in subsequent chapters, the mechanics of 
the approach are straightforward. Consider the two equation model below,  
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In the model above, iy  stand for the outcome of interest. To asses the impact on iy  I control for many 
other variables captured in Xji apart from NREGSi. In the second equation Z1 ,Z2,   Z3 are instrumental 
variables (IV) which are assumed to be correlated with NREGSi but are valid exclusions from (3).  
In addition to variables which capture the economic status of the HH, I also asses the effect of the 
programme on a non-economic variable ‘reduction of stress’. This is an ordinal variable in my survey. 
During my survey, HH were asked to answer on the question,   
‘Does this scheme (NREGS) reduce your anxiousness/worries/stress in terms of getting job? a) to a 
great extent b) moderately c) to a small extent d) extremely small e) not at all’  
I transform these  responses into 3 specific outcomes. ‘0’ as outcome-1 where responses e) are taken, 
‘1’ as outcome-2 where responses c) and d) are clubbed together, ‘2’ as outcome 3 where responses a) 
and b) are clubbed together. Then my variable of interest ‘reduction of stress’ becomes an ordered 
variable with ‘0’, ‘1’, and ‘2’ depending upon the order of response. To estimate this model I use an 
Ordered Probit Regression model.  
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Chapter 4: 
Results and findings 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides results and findings of my data analysis. This findings of  the study draw upon 
information from 500 households, 2,249 individuals and 70 individual work schemes initiated under 
the NREGS. In addition, anecdotal evidence obtained during the field work is also used to supplement 
findings.  
4.2 Results and findings on the issue of targeting 
To examine the issue of ‘who is accessing this programme’, this study begins by exploring the data on 
the basis of bivariate statistical analysis and then provides an examination of this issue using probit 
and tobit regression models (as outlined in section 3).   
 
4.2.1 Descriptive statistics - Targeting 
To begin with the NREGS has been very successful in terms of disseminating information in a short 
period of time. In my sample survey, 99.40 % of households were familiar with the name of the 
scheme and it is by far the best known government scheme. For example, other schemes such as the 
IAY7 and the SGSY8 which have been in operation for longer periods of time are known by 61% of 
households and 56% of households in my sample. Although the scheme has started relatively recently, 
in terms of its potential outreach it is widespread as 84.60 % of household in my sample have a job 
card9. Among the job card holders 93.4 % household have applied for a job. More interestingly among 
the applicants, 68.35% of household said that they did not apply for the job by themselves rather they 
have been asked to do so by the Panchayat or some other agency like Gram Unnayan Samilty (GUS)10 
or PRI members. Among the applicants 95.95% of households have received jobs through the NREGS 
for at least one day since the inception of the programme in February 2006. 
Table-5 provides information on the average person-days worked by those household who applied for 
NREGS job after having a job card. As the table shows, since inception, on average households have 
received about 20 days per year through the scheme as opposed to the 100 days. Additionally, the 
table shows that those who applied for NREGS job after being instructed by somebody else to apply 
                                                 
7 IAY- Indira Awas Yojona, a schemes for building houses for below poverty line household having dilapidated housing 
condition. 
8 SGSY- Swarnojayanti Grameen Swarojgar Yojona, a schems for assisting self help group. 
9  See Glossary-3 
10 See Glossary-4   
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have got relatively larger number of person days of work compared to those who applied for a job by 
themselves. The relationship between the higher number of days for and being instructed to apply (by 
‘Gram Panchayat’ or ‘Panchayat Member’, ‘GUS Secretary’ and local ‘political person’) is explored 
in more detail later on in this section.  
 
Table-5: Average person-days worked with nature of Job seeker (i.e. who applied for Job). 
Nature of Job seeker No. of HH 
Average no of person-
days worked since 
inception of NREGS 
Average no of person-
days worked during 
last year in NREGS 
Applied by themselves. 125 54.57 16.92 
Applied as somebody else 
instructed to apply 270 64.40 19.65 
Total 395 61.29 18.79 
Source: Author’s calculation from surveyed data from Birbhum District, West Bengal, India 
Note: all the data refers till July 2009. 
 
Tables 6 and 7 provide interesting information on accessing the NREGS and labour market returns. 
From Table 6 it is observed that those who have worked under NREGS in the last one year have 
received 24.36 days of work on average and earned Rs. 2126.01 at an average daily wage rate of Rs. 
87. These same households have also worked in the Non-NREGS11 sector for 339.19 days12 on an 
average (household as a whole) and earned Rs. 26175.93 or an average daily wage rate of Rs. 77. 
These figures show that the non-NREGS labour market opportunities for those who have worked in 
the NREGS are not as attractive as working in the scheme.  
 
Table-6: Comparison of value of Person-days in NREGS and Non-NREGS sector among those 
304 HH who worked through NREGS during last one year after applying for Job. 
 
Category of work sector Average days worked as HH 
Average Total 
Income (in Rs.) 
Average daily-income 
from days of work (in Rs.)
In NREGS (as total HH) 24.36  2126.01 87.27 
In Non-NREGS sector 
(as total HH) 339.19  26175.93 77.17 
Source: Authors Calculation from the surveyed data. Figure in the bracket showing the standard deviation  
 
                                                 
11 Here days worked in Non-NREGS sector includes sum of days of work in main occupation and subsidiary occupation 
other than NREGS. For detail elaboration please see annexure-5 and notes on definition.  
 
12 By no of days of work means how many days in a year HH as whole remained engaged in economic activity. For 
example if a person does 2 or 3 different economic activities in a day and if a person do only one activity (may be of 2 hr. 
or 8 hr.) in a day for both the person no of days of work worked during that day will be counted as one. Similarly we will 
define no of days of work for all member of the HH and then will add up to come up no of days of work worked as a HH.   
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The figures in Table 7 show that average income per working day for those who have not applied for 
NREGS jobs is far higher and clearly for them working in the non-NREGS sector is far more lucrative. 
As the figures show, non-NREGS options for those on the NREGS yield an daily wage rate of Rs. 
77.67 while it is Rs. 190.26 for those household who have job cards but have not applied for jobs 
through NREGS, and it is Rs. 338.72 for those household who have no Job card at all. Thus, the 
programme appears to be successful in terms of supporting and attracting those individuals who do not 
have very good labour market alternatives.  
Table-7: Comparison of Value of Person-days in Non-NREGS sector among different categories of HH.  
Category of HH Average Days worked Average total Income 
Average income from 
one working days 
HH who Got Job through 
NREGS 337.59 26222.47 77.67 
HH having Job card but not 
applied for NREGS 411.57 78307.71 190.26 
HH having no Job card at all 384.51 130241.57 338.72 
Source: Authors Calculation from the surveyed data. 
 
Interaction of ‘ NREGS accessibility’  with RHS Score13:  
 
In my sample data set, 69.4 % households have been traced out that are enlisted in the RHS-2005 
(prepared by Govt of West Bengal) among which 43.5% are BPL. Amongst these household (whose 
names are available in RHS), 76.65 % have got jobs through NREGS. The following table shows the 
interaction of ‘NREGS accessibility’ with RHS score. It is very interesting to note that those who have 
not applied for NREGS job (the bottom two categories of household in Table 8) have higher RHS 
scores, which implies they are further away from the poverty line (as RHS<=33 implies BPL). So 
Table 8 shows that those who have applied for NREGS job are living in the neighborhood of the 
poverty line. This pattern along with the earlier discussion (Tables 6 and 7) suggests that the NREGS 
appears to be much more likely to cater to the poor, that is, those with lower RHS scores. 
Table-8: RHS status of Job seeker. 
Nature of Household Average RHS score 
Those who applied for NREGS job by themselves. 35. 31 
Those who applied for NREGS job as somebody 
instructed to apply 33.07 
Having Job Card not applied for NREGS Job 43.91 
Not applied because they do not even have the Job Card. 
(may be they don’t need NREGS) 43.06 
 Source: author’s calculation from the surveyed data  
                                                 
13 See Glossary-5 
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Tables 9 & 10 show access to NREGS and number of days worked under NREGS with reference to 
the household lying below and above the state’s poverty line reflected in RHS-2005. In my sample of 
500 households there are 347 households who I have been able to locate in the RHS. Among these 347 
households, 262 households have actually worked under NREGS for at least for one day since 
inception and out of 347, 219 households have worked for at least one day in NREGS during the last 
one year. It is again interesting to note from Table 9 that BPL household’s participation is not only 
higher in comparison to APL but such representation is proportionately higher than the BPL household 
in total RHS itself. Moreover, no of days availed through NREGS reflected in table-10 is also higher 
for the BPL households as compared to APL households. This essentially shows greater access of 
NREGS by BPL households as compared to APL households.  
 
Table-9: Comparison between APL and BPL in terms of getting access of NREGS (among those 
who worked for positive no. of day in NREGS and listed in RHS-2005 ) 
 
Classification 
of household 
% of HH got job under 
NREGS (since inception): 
(on total HH=262 out of 500)
% of HH got job under 
NREGS (during last one year): 
 (on total HH=219 out of 500) 
% of HH in Total RHS. 
(on total HH=347 out 
of 500) 
BPL HH  
(RHS<=33) 
51.15 52.97 43.52 
APL HH 
(RHS>=34) 
48.85 47.03 56.48 
Source: author’s calculation .from the surveyed data  
 
 
 
Table: 10 Comparison of APL and BPL in terms of average no. of days worked (among those 
who worked for positive no. of day in NREGS and listed in RHS-2005) 
 
Classification of household No. of days worked  under 
NREGS on average (since 
inception) 
No. of days worked  under 
NREGS on average (during last 
one year) 
BPL (RHS<=33) 74.80 26.18 
APL(RHS>=34) 64.46 24.12 
ALL(RHS>=12) 69.75 25.21 
Source: author’s calculation .from the surveyed data  
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Interaction of ‘ NREGS accessibility’ with land holding14: 
 
In the sample of 500 households the average landholding of the household is 0.87 acre as against 0.73 
acre for the district as whole. Among these, households with marginal land holding (i.e. less than 1 
hectare or 2.471 acre as per NSSO, India ) are 90.2%, households with zero land holding is 40.4% and 
land less households (i.e. land owned15 <0.0049 acre as per NSSO, India) are 9.8%.  
 
Table 11: Access of NREGS as per different Land holding Class.  
 
Land Holding 
class (in acres) 
% of HH in 
total Sample 
of 500 HH 
% of HH those who worked 
under NREGS since inception 
of the programme (i.e. 370 HH) 
% of HH those who worked 
under NREGS during last one 
year.  (i.e. 303 HH) 
Land holding=0 40.4 41.08 40.59 
> 0 to < 0.5 14.2 16.22 15.84 
0.5 to < 1.0 13.8 15.67 16.50 
1.0 to < 1.5 11.2 12.43 11.88 
1.5 to < 2.0 4.4 4.59 5.62 
2.0 to < 2.471 6.2 4.59 4.29 
2.471 and above 9.8 5.42 5.28 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: author’s calculation .from the surveyed data  
 
 
 
Table: 12 Land holding class wise average number of person-days worked  
 
Land Holding class 
(in acres) 
Average no. of person-days 
worked since inception of the 
programme 
Average no. of person-days 
worked during last 1 yr. 
Land holding=0 64.11 24.97 
> 0 to < 0.5 62.72 21.25 
0.5 to < 1.0 64.29 27.27 
1.0 to < 1.5 67.61 22.75 
1.5 to < 2.0 62.47 19.06 
2.0 to < 2.471 53.53 24.61 
2.471 and above 94.50 32.06 
Total 65.43 24.49 
Source: author’s calculation .from the surveyed data  
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Here land holding implies operational land holding which is sum of agricultural land owned and net lease in of 
agricultural land. i.e. Land Holding= (Agricultural land owned) + (Leased in Land) – (Leased out land).  
15 Land owned = (Homestead land + agricultural land owned) 
 37
Table: 13 Distribution of ‘total person-days generated’ as per land holding class of household. 
Land Holding 
class (in acres) 
% of HH in total 
Sample of 500 
HH 
Share of Person-days availed from 
total person-days generated by all 
participating HH within the sample 
(since inception.) 
Share of Person-days availed 
from total person-days generated 
by all participating HH within the 
sample (during last one year) 
Land holding=0 40.4 40.25 41.39 
> 0 to < 0.5 14.2 15.54 13.74 
0.5 to < 1.0 13.8 15.40 18.23 
1.0 to < 1.5 11.2 12.85 11.04 
1.5 to < 2.0 4.4 4.38 4.36 
2.0 to < 2.471 6.2 3.76 4.32 
2.471 and above 9.8 7.82 6.92 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: author’s calculation .from the surveyed data  
 
From table 11 it is quite clear that those who are availing NREGS work both since inception and 
during last one year by and large are small land holding households.  Moreover, households with zero 
land holding are participating in highest percentage among all land holding class and their 
participation is higher than their total percentage in the sample itself. However, when we are looking 
at the average no of person days worked as per land holding class i.e. table 12 it is quite surprising that 
in spite of getting relatively less access in NREGS, households once entered in the programme are 
working considerably high no. of average person days if the household belongs to non-marginal land 
holding class. But, how far this phenomenon leading a real capture of the programme by the non-
marginal land holding class that can be readily answered from the table 13. In my sample total person-
days worked by all 500 households taken together are 24,208 since inception of the programme and 
7,421 during last one year. Table 13 shows the distribution of the total person days generated by the 
programme to different land holding classes. It is evident from table 13 that non-marginal land holding 
classes account for a very small percentage (i.e. 7.82% since inception and 6.92% during last one year) 
of total person days generated through NREGS. Moreover, within the marginal land holding class 
there is an even distribution of total person days generated through this programme. In the lower tail of 
the land holding class such sharing is even better represented compared to the percentage in the 
sample itself and in the upper tails it is less represented compared to the percentage in the sample itself. 
The overall finding emerging from these three tables is that access to NREGS both since inception and 
during last one year is much higher for household with relatively lower land holding. This is 
essentially saying that if land holding is a proxy of economic prosperity of the household then 
relatively poorer households are more likely to participate in the NREGS.  
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But how far land holding correlates or establishes a causal relation with the poverty or economic status 
of the households is tested separately (see the appendix 5 & 6). Results16 from these estimations 
confirm that land holding is a good predictor or proxy of household’s poverty status and economic 
status.  
 
Interaction of ‘NREGS accessibility’ with monthly per-capita expenditure adjusted after NREGS 
income (mpce_nregs): 
 
As per the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO), India 61st round (2004-05), Rs. 382.82 (at 
99-00 current prices) is the per-capita per-month requirement of consumer expenditure to stay just 
above the official poverty line in Rural West Bengal.  Taking that figure into consideration and 
adjusting the per-capita per-month consumption expenditure of my sample with proper deflation with 
successive consumer price index and deducting per-capita income from NREGS, I generate the 
following table.  Table 14 shows that households with relatively lower consumption expenditure are 
more likely to get a larger number of days of work under the NREGS. 
 
Table 14: Access of NREGS and BPL threshold consumer expenditure.  
 
Category of HH as per MPCE No of days worked under 
NREGS on average (since 
inception) 
No of days worked under 
NREGS on average (during last 
one year) 
mpce_nregp<= Rs. 382.82 83.54 32.26 
mpce_nregs>Rs. 382.82 60.27 22.07 
All HH 65.42 24.49 
 
Source: author’s calculation .from the surveyed data  
Note: Rs. 382.82 is the per-month per-capita Rural Expenditure for West Bengal as per the NSSO 61st 
Round 2004-05, here monthly per capita expenditure adjusted after NREGS income and rate of 
inflation.     
 
 
 
                                                 
16 With fall in land holding a household likely to be a poor (as per BPL score under RHS) increases in a statistically 
significant manner under Probit estimate of BPL (appendix-5) and under OLS estimates of household economic status 
(appendix-6) on land holding showing as land holding increases adj
impce , mpi and savings increases significantly. 
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Table 15: Access of NREGS and Different Class of MPCE adjusted after NREGS income. 
 
 
Source: Authors’ Calculation for the surveyed data  
 
From table 15 it is evident that lowest four consumption classes representing 20.2% households in the 
sample but they are sharing 31.72% of total generated person-days through NREGS. On the contrary 
highest 4 consumption classes representing 34.6% households in the sample but they are sharing only 
17.64% of total person-days generated through NREGS. Moreover, comparing column 3, 4, 5 in table 
15 it is also clear that lower consumption classes are better represented both by share of total days and 
by no of person-days worked.      
Therefore both by land holding and by consumption expenditure it is apparent that poorer households 
are mostly accessing this NREGS. 
 
Interaction of ‘NREGS accessibility’ with political participation 
During the survey respondents were asked whether any member from their household had participated 
in the election campaign in the West Bengal Panchayat Election (2008) and Indian Parliamentary 
Election (2009). The immediate question after this was for which party they campaigned and voted for. 
For the 1st question almost all the respondent replied with yes or no but for the following question we 
received different kinds of responses  - some clearly responded by stating the name of the party they 
had voted for while the rest either did not respond or said they did not vote. We treat this non 
respondent category of household as either apolitical or non-political category and termed them as ‘No 
vote’ category as against ‘vote left’ and ‘vote non-left’. In table 17 the responses to these questions are 
classified in three categories. Vote left means they voted and campaigned for the ruling coalition i.e. 
either CPIM or CPI or Forward Block or RSP, vote non-left means they voted and campaigned for 
either Congress or TMC or BJP or Nirdal (protested left) or SUCI and no vote means either did not 
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vote and campaigned or not responded. Table 16 shows that there is little dividend in terms of 
accessing a greater number of working day in NREGS, if somebody takes part in election campaigns. 
However, table 17 shows that those who voted and campaigned for the left worked for 79.43 days on 
average (since inception) under NREGS and have access to 41.99 % (highest among all 3 categories) 
of total person-days created since inception of the programme in spite of accounting for only 31.6% of 
the sample. While it is possible that this simply reflects that the poorest households are more likely to 
vote for the left, we will investigate this aspect in more detail in the subsequent multivariate regression 
analysis where we will control for both poverty and party affiliation. 
 
Table 16: Access of NREGS and campaign during election. 
 
Take Part in the 
campaign(any member 
from HH) 
% of HH No of days worked under 
NREGS on average (since 
inception) 
No of days worked under 
NREGS on average (during 
last one year) 
Yes 52.52 68.71 26.27 
No 47.48 61.14 22.12 
Total 100 65.42 24.49 
Source: Authors’ Calculation for the surveyed data  
 
 
Table 17: Access of NREGS as per Political Inclination (through campaign and vote) 
Party 
Inclination 
% of HH in 
total Sample 
of 500 HH 
% of HH those who 
worked under NREGS 
since inception of the 
programme (i.e. 370 HH) 
Share (or %) of Person-days 
availed from total person-
days generated within the 
sample since inception. 
Average  person-
days worked in 
NREGS (since 
inception)  
Vote Left 31.6 34.59 41.99 79.43 
Vote Non-left  27.4 28.38 25.20 58.11 
No-Vote 41 37.03 32.79 57.95 
Total  100 100 100 65.42 
Source: Authors’ Calculation for the surveyed data  
 
Interaction of ‘NREGS accessibility’ with Social Group or Caste. 
Finally, this study examines the interaction of NREGS accessibility with Social Group or Caste. 
Historically the Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) community in India have been 
economically and socially deprived and it is likely that they are not able to access this programme. 
Table 18 shows that this is not the case. It is clear from this table that SCs and STs are better 
represented in the NREGS in terms of getting access of the programme and also availing 
proportionately higher share or percentage of total person-days generated through this programme in 
comparison to their own share in the sample household. 
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Table 18: Access of NREGS as per different Social Group or Caste 
Social Group 
or caste 
% of HH in total 
Sample of 500 HH 
% of HH those who worked 
under NREGS since 
inception of the programme 
(i.e. 370 HH) 
Share (or %) of Person-
days availed from total 
person-days generated 
within the sample since 
inception. 
General 
(Bramhin) 4.20 1.08 0.46 
General (Non- 
Bramhin)  44.00 40.54 32.83 
OBC 6.00 5.14 3.45 
SC 41.80 48.38 56.43 
ST 4 4.86 6.83 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: Authors’ Calculation for the surveyed data  
 
4.2.2 Regression based results and findings on targeting 
4.2.2.1 Accessing the programme – Probit estimates  
 
From the binary response model (i.e. probit model, estimates are provided in appendix 1 with different 
specification 1-5), based on different specifications, the following common findings emerge. I provide 
comments only on those determinants which are statistically significant.  
 
Probability of getting access of NREGS job [i.e. P (nregsi=1)] falls: 
 
1) By 3 to 6 percentage points (depending on the nature of specification) with a 1 acre increase in 
land holding.  
2) By 6 to 13 percentage points (depending on the nature of specification) if  HH leases in land 
for cultivation instead of not leasing land. 
3) By 1 to 2.5 percentage points (depending on the nature of specification) for every Rs.100 
increase in monthly per-capita expenditure adjusted after NREGS. 
4) By 13 percentage points (with specification-2) if household did not vote instead of voting for 
the left during the last election. Here, it is interesting to note that there is no statistically 
significant difference in accessing NREGS job if the household voted non-left instead of 
voting for the left. 
5) By 4 percentage point (with specification-5) for every 10 point increase in RHS score 
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On the other hand probability of getting access of NREGS job [i.e. P (nregsi=1)] increases – 
 
1) By 3.4 to 3.5 percentage point (with specification 1 and 2) with the increase of one cattle in the 
household.  
2) By 15 to 16 percentage points (with specification 1 & 2) if household’s social Group is SC or 
ST instead of General caste.  
3) By 7.6 to 9.2 percentage point (with specification 3, 4, 5) if the member of household knows 
the payment pattern of the NREGS instead of not knowing the procedure. 
 
So if we assume higher land holding, land lease in feature, higher monthly per-capita expenditure, 
higher RHS score, General caste (higher caste in the society) are as good proxy of comparatively more 
prosperous household (which has already established through significant nexus between Land holding-
Poverty-Economic Status’ in previous sub-section- see also the appendix 5 and 6), then from the above 
findings one can say that targeting of NREGS at least in terms of access is working quite well. 
However, how far such trend persists in accessing the actual no of person-days, we have to dig more.   
 
4.2.2.2 Number of days worked in NREGS since inception – Tobit Estimates 
After having an idea on the issues related to accessing the programme, this sub section will try to 
predict the factors which are actually determining the extent of person-days worked through NREGS. 
After running the Tobit regression of Number of days worked under NREGS since inception on many 
factors related to household, following are the factors which appeared with significant statistical result 
among those are economically significant too (Tobit Regression and results are given in appendix-2). 
 
Land effect:  
‘Land holding’ is no more a significant determinant of availing jobs in terms of person-days in 
NREGS. Rather holding of ‘Irrigated land17” plays a crucial role. If the irrigated land holding 
increases by 1 acre, then number of days worked under NREGS since inception decreases by around 
4.5 days on average (specification-1). And it is to be noted that irrigated cultivable land is more 
precious than only cultivable land as irrigated land allows one to cultivate even in the non-monsoon 
period through the irrigation facility.    
                                                 
17 Irrigated land is that kind of land where HH can cultivate even in non-monsoon period with the help of the available 
external irrigation facilities. HH with more irrigated land beside other cultivable land are treated as more prosperous HH. 
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Social Group effect: 
There is huge effect of social group. The marginal effect of being a SC household as compared to 
belonging to the General caste is 13 to 18 days (depending on different specification). If the household 
is ST instead of being a General caste then the marginal effect ranges from 16 to 30 days (depending 
on different specification). 
Religion Effect: 
There is also the religion effect on the no. of days of work under NREGS. If the household is a Hindu 
instead of being Muslim then chances of getting jobs under NREGS reduces by 3 to 7 days (depending 
on different specification).  
Party effect: 
In the Tobit model under all the specification it is quite clear that there is consistent and significant 
(both economically and statistically) effect of political inclination on the no. of days worked under 
NREGS. Those who have campaigned and voted for non-left (i.e. supporter of non-left) received on an 
average around 7 days less under NREGS as compared to those household who voted for the left (i.e. 
the supporter of left i.e. the ruling coalition) and the difference is much sharper for those who have not 
voted (may be due to dejection about politics or may be due to indifference towards politics). For this 
category of household they received around 11 to 12 days of less NREGS work as compared to those 
who voted and campaigned for the left.  
Awareness effect:  
 This is very interesting to mention that household who knows about the payment procedure and 
measurement procedure of the NREGS programme are getting on an average 10 to 13 days more 
NREGS job in comparison to those households who worked under NREGS but do not know the exact 
payment and measurement procedure of the work. 
 
Monthly consumption Expenditure (adjusted after NREGS income) effect 
From this Tobit regression this is also evident that with the rise in monthly consumption expenditure 
adjusted after NREGS (mpce_nregs), the no of person-days worked under NREGS decreases. 
Considering different model specification (1 to 4), if mpce_nregs of household increases by 100 
Rupees then person-days worked under NREGS falls by 2 days. This means referring table 15, the 
lowest 2 consumption class will get around 14 days more job compared to the two highest 
consumption classes.  
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4.2.3 Conclusion on Targeting 
So from descriptive stat analysis and regression based results on targeting aspect of NREGS it is to be 
asserted that there is no apparent evidence of mis-targeting in terms of access of NREGS keeping in 
view on the underlying objective of this self-targeted programme.  After establishing the nexus 
between Landholding-household’s economic status-Poverty with many other determinants of poverty, 
it is fairly comprehensible that NREGS in Birbhum district, West Bengal has not been mis-targeted 
through relatively higher non-poor participation. However, it has been partly tempered by those 
household who have a left inclination. On the other hand, NREGS is giving lesser dividends at least in 
terms of person-days worked under this scheme for those households which have ‘left’ alienation.  
 
4.3 Results and findings on the issue of efficiency of the PRI 
This sub-section will focus on the issue of the efficiency of the PRI from 3 different angles. First, I 
will examine the efficiency of PRI from payment lag perspective on the basis of 70 individual scheme 
based case studies i.e. whether GPs have been able to ensure wage payment within 15 days of start of 
each scheme. Second, efficiency will be judged on the basis of average person days created as against 
people’s expectation in 13 sample GPs. Third, efficiency of the PRI will be investigated from lean 
period perspective based on secondary data on person-days creation and expenditure on NREGS 
available at the district level and responses on lean period job in primary survey. 
 
4.3.1 Tracking payment delays  
 
In this section we will focus on institutional efficiency more precisely efficiency of GP. I have already 
mentioned that here efficiency refers only to whether the institutions have been able to deliver wages 
of labourers who have worked under NREGS within the stipulated 15 days maximum time limit.  To 
trace the overall lag between date of start of work to date of payment and to identify the source of the 
delay I noted the following dates in each step of the process from inception of work to payment: 
 
1. Date of start of work: on which the work of a particular scheme starts with a minimum number 
of workers. (Source: Schemes register)  
2. Date of 1st measurement: on which the technical person from the GP measures physical output 
of work done after 1st round of work. Then this physical output of work was converted into 
person-days equivalence on the basis of the piece rate of work. (Source: Measurement 
Book/sheet)  
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3. Date of Muster Roll preparation: on which clerical work to covert the physical output of work 
in terms of person-days are made to each worker in the form of muster roll. It is a list of names 
of workers with corresponding physical output of work and equivalent money as wages that a 
worker will receive after doing work in that round for which measurement has been done. 
(Source: Muster roll files) 
4. Date of advance received or payment advice sent to bank/ post office for payment: After 
preparation of muster roll, amount of money to be paid as wages are drawn as advance (before 
the institutional payment system) by the GP officials from the GP’s bank account or the 
officials send a payment advice for each worker to the disbursing bank or post office (after the 
institutional payments system was installed). (Source: GP Advance register) 
5. Date of Payment: The exact date on which payment has been made or workers were received 
money as their wages. This date has been traced from the job-card or bank/post office account 
pass book of workers. 
 
After tracing out these dates from 70 individual schemes over 2006-07 to 2009-10, I defined 1st round 
lag as the measurement lag i.e. lag between Date of start of work and Date of 1st measurement, then 
the 2nd round lag as the muster roll lag i.e. lag between Date of 1st measurement and Date of Muster 
Roll preparation and finally the 3rd round lag as the disbursement lag i.e. lag between the Date of 
Muster Roll preparation to Date of Payment. The total lag is the lag between date of start of work to 
Date of payment. 
 
 
Findings from these case studies- 
 
Table: 19: Total Payment lag and its break up over the years. 
Year Measurement 
lag 
Muster-roll 
lag 
Disbursement 
lag Total lag 
2006-07 9.87 29.00 2.80 41.67 
2007-08 6.95 3.32 13.86 24.14 
2008-09 8.61 10.67 0.94 20.22 
2009-10 6.00 12.25 6.88 25.13 
Average 8 12.67 6.65 27.32 
Source: Calculated from field surveyed data by the author 
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Figure: 3 Pattern and composition of Payment lag of NREGS wage. 
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Source: Calculated from field surveyed data by the author 
From the table 19 and the figure 3 it is evident that- 
1. The average lag in my 70 odds individual scheme based case study is 27.32 days i.e. labourers 
are getting their daily wages every time after almost one month lag though it is mentioned in 
the schemes guide line that payment has to be made within 15 days of start of work. Moreover, 
such delayed payment negates the basic spirit of the safety net argument of NREGS. 
2. 1st round lag is 8 days 
3. 2nd round lag is 12.67 days 
4. 3rd round lag is 6.65 days. 
5. But if we look at the figure-3 then we can see from 2006-07 to 2008-09 the total lag on an 
average is falling but it again starts increasing from the end of the 2008-09, specially the period 
from when institutional payments begin to start.   
6. In this sample of 7 GPs from where these case studies were drawn Harisara GP under Sainthia 
Block of Birbhum District registered highest average total payment lag of 64.6 days and 
Rupuspur GP under Khoyrasole Block of Birbhum District register lowest lag of 13.75 days. 
 4.3.2 Days created versus days desired  
Table-20 provides information on the number of person-days created as against the desire for jobs in 
13 Gram Panchayats. Overall, the figures show that the number of desired days per year is 204 while 
the days actually created is 61 days since inception or only about 20 days per year. Thus, the program 
is meeting about 10 percent of the demand for jobs while at the same time meeting only 20 percent of 
legal provision of 100 days. There is substantial variation in job creation across GPs with the best 
performing GPs creating about three times more jobs than the laggards. Clearly, the gaps across GPs 
deserve special administrative attention in order to identify the reasons for such a dismal performance. 
 47
Table 20: GP wise average person-days creation (based on sample household) 
 
Source: Calculated from field surveyed data by the author 
 
 
4.3.3 Seasonality of NREGS performance- looking efficiency of PRI from safety net perspective. 
Based on secondary data from the Birbhum district, figure 4 & 5 depict the seasonality of the NREGS 
performance in terms of person days creation and the expenditure incurred on NREGS. Both the 
figures demonstrate that person days generation and expenditure on NREGS are gradually increasing 
from beginning to end for each of last 3 financial years. Both figures confirm the fact that the 
programme performed much better at least in terms of these 2 indicators for the financial year 2007-08 
and for this year Birbhum was the highest spending district among all the districts in West Bengal. 
Year 2008-09 was a poor performing year as compared to the last 3 years. Expenditure and person 
days generated increases quite sharply at the end of each financial year implying there could be a 
pressure from the upper tier of government to spend money within that year so that spill over of 
money remain less. This trend essentially portrays the truth of administrative phenomenon of spending 
at the fag end of financial year. On the contrary when there is real need for creation of jobs specially in 
the lean period i.e. mid of August to mid of November, there is hardly any increase in the spending or 
job creation pattern and there by negating the possibility of promoting this programnme as a safety net 
in the lean period. We will check that aspect in next table 21. 
 
 
 
Rank on the basis 
of sample survey 
Name of the GP Average no of person-days 
generated since inception of NREGS 
Average no of person-days wish to get in 
a year (feed back from HH respondent) 
01 Khoyrasole 92.87 177.78 
02 Panrui 84.75 157.22 
03 Kundala 83.00 197.13 
04 Parulia 81.42 213 
05 Harisara 80.77 201.13 
06 Bahiri Panch Soya 71.23 231.73 
07 Rupuspur 51.38 245.31 
08 Gonpur 45.80 168.65 
09 Joydeb 40.03 216.78 
10 Barrah 39.40 219.4 
11 Mollarpur-II 29.63 249.54 
12 Ulkunda 28.07 185.07 
13 Bajit pur 27.26 159.63 
 Total 61.29 203.84 
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Figure 4: Seasonality in person days creation: 
Month wise flow of Person-days generation for Birbhum 
District
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Source: Office of the District Nodal Officer, NREGS, Birbhum District, Govt. of West Bengal 
Figure 5: Seasonality in expenditure made on NREGS 
Month wise expenditure incurred on NREGS for Birbhum 
District
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Source: Office of the District Nodal Officer, NREGS, Birbhum District, Govt. of West Bengal 
Table 21: Nature of Employment during ‘LEAN PERIOD’ (Mid of August to End of November) 
within sample HH (those who got job through NREGS also).  
 
Year Average 
Days availed 
through non-
NREGS 
Average 
Income earned 
through non-
NREGS 
Average income 
from one working 
day  through non-
NREGS 
Average Days 
availed 
through 
NREGS 
Average Income 
earned through 
NREGS 
Average income 
from one working 
day  through 
NREGS 
2006-07 41.76 826.01 19.78 5.25 361.2 68.80 
2007-08 42.71 984.89 23.06 3.55 264.83 74.60 
2008-09 42.12 1221.48 29 3.41 281.49 82.55 
Average  42.19 1010.79 23.96 4.07 302.51 74.32 
Source: Calculated from field surveyed data by the author 
 
From Table 21 it is clear that in the agricultural lean period (as defined by Middle of August to End of 
November) NREGS has not served as an alternative source of livelihood. This period is typically 
characterized as severe scarcity of livelihood opportunity due to drying up of typical agricultural 
activity. Poor rural household has to cope up this situation typically either by distressed migration or 
selling durable possessions including livestock, utensils etc. The occasional jobs which are available in 
this period do not ensure any steady source of income. From the table 21 such phenomenon is also 
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evident from 4th column which shows how unproductive the days of work under non-NREGS sector. 
Surprisingly the jobs created through NREGS during this period are abnormally low meaning NREGS 
not at all appearing as a income safety net for these household. Anecdotes received from implementing 
PRI bodies that during this lean period monsoon does not allow to do earth work which is again 
predominant component of work under NREGS.   
 
4.3.4. Conclusion on Efficiency of PRI 
In section 4.3.1 to 4.3.3 we discussed institutional efficiency from 3 perspectives viz.  
i) from payment lag perspective based on 70 case studies,  
ii) from average person days created as against the people’s expectation based on 13 sample GP 
iii) from lean period perspective based on secondary data on person-days creation and expenditure on  
      NREGS available at the district level and responses on lean period job in the primary survey.  
 
From these case studies it is evident that implementing government institutions i.e. GPs seem to fail 
the efficiency of delivering the wages in 15 days due time as mentioned in the programme guide line. 
Though, over these 4 years total payment lag is by and large falling. However, an important question 
is whether the poor can afford this lag or whether these delayed payments are creating any disincentive 
for the participating households to remain employed in the programme. Moreover, how far these 
lagged payments reduce the stress or anxiety of the participating household in respect of joblessness is 
also an important point of concern. I will argue on this aspect again after accessing the impact of the 
programme on the household economic status along with its level of stress or anxiety related to 
joblessness in sub-section for impact. Person-days created against person-days desired to work seem 
also gloomy as the programme has been able to deliver only around 20 days average per year as 
against 204 days of expectation and 100 days legal obligation.  Similarly NREGS has not been 
appearing as a source of safety net income by providing jobs in the lean period.  
 
From these analysis of efficiency it is being revealed that PRI bodies and more precisely the GPs are 
not able to provide payments of wages in stipulated time frame as in the guideline, they are no way 
near to the people’s expectation nor achieving the national average and finally the district trend and 
sporadic responses are showing that NREGS is not serving as a source of income safety net.  
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4.4 Results and findings on the issue of impact 
After examining the targeting and efficiency aspects of NREGS this section turns to an examination of 
the impact of the program. More specifically, the paper investigates the impact of NREGS on 
household’s monthly per-capita consumption expenditure, monthly per-capita income, total savings, 
total loan or outstanding debt and on reduction of stress or anxiety related to joblessness.  
 
4.4.1. Impact on Household economic status: 
OLS and IV regression estimates of the impact of NREGS  
The main challenge in terms of identifying the impact of NREGS on outcomes is that due to the self-
targeted nature of the programme households with the weakest economic outcomes are most likely to 
participate in the program and hence unless one can credibly control for other observed and 
unobserved characteristics that have a bearing on economic outcomes it will be difficult to obtain an 
unbiased estimate of the impact of the NREGS programme on economic outcomes. While it is difficult, 
this paper attempts to isolate the impact by first using OLS to compare those who access the NREGS 
programme with different control groups and second by using various control groups and an 
instrumental variables strategy (as outlined in chapter 3). 
 
4.4.1.1 OLS estimates: 
The paper assesses the impact of NREGS days of work on monthly per-capita income, monthly per-
capita consumption expenditure, total savings and total loans. I begin by running OLS regressions 
based on the same specification for (i).All 500 HH – comparisons between those who access the 
NREGS and those who don’t (ii) 423 households, that is, restricting the sample to those households 
who have a job card (iii) 395 households, that is, restricting the sample to those households who have 
applied for a job (iv) 379 households who have worked in NREGS. OLS estimates are presented in 
Table 22. From different combination of household as mentioned above (i to iv) one would be more 
interested to see the impact of NREGS days of work on outcome of interest for those households who 
have finally worked in NREGS i.e. in this case 379 households. From table 22 it is being observed that 
the OLS estimates are showing a negative relationship between ‘NREGS days of work since 
inception’ with income and expenditure and moreover these relations becoming statistically 
insignificant as one move from all households combination to only those households who finally 
worked in NREGS. The negative relation under OLS is not unexpected as the NREGS uptake is 
highest amongst the poorer and one would expect that an OLS specification displays such a pattern.  
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4.4.1.2 IV estimates  
While the OLS estimates display that there is no statistically significant link between number of 
NREGS days and various economic outcomes, this may be driven by the endogeneity between 
participation in NREGS and economic outcomes (already discussed in part in section 3.4.2). To 
control for this I now use an IV approach. The main challenge is to find variables that have a bearing 
on access to NREGS but do not directly determine consumption (other economic outcomes).  As I 
argue below, I use household political affiliation (vote left, vote no left, no vote,) and awareness of the 
NREGS payment procedure as instruments for NREGS participation.  
 
Rationale for choosing instrumental variables: 
Economic Logic: 
 In my bunch of 3 IV precisely I have two categories of variable. One as the political variable which 
comes from the answer against the question related to respondent’s participation in election campaign 
and voting behavior during last two elections held in 2008 and early 2009. Another variable is like 
awareness about NREGS. Now in the context of West Bengal where left party rule is in operation 
from last 32 years and given the literature of clientelistic relation with left-party and different schemes 
beneficiaries my assumption is following- 
Current period consumption, income, savings and loan will not be affected by such political 
participation which is heavily shaped by prolonged party-structure and party-machinery in last 32 
years, rather dynamics of change of those economic variables (income, consumption, savings, loan) 
should have a systematic impact of such prolonged patron client relation influenced by specific 
political inclination. 
 However, direct benefit like NREGS could highly be distributed or tempered according to explicit 
political inclination even in the short run. On other hand awareness about NREGS could also imply 
the household or the individual is an advanced one and through same logic such advanced character of 
household should affect the change or dynamics of change of household economic variables or status 
but it will not significantly affect current period consumption, income, savings, loan in a significant 
way. Current period of consumption, income, savings, loan are more susceptible to sudden shock 
occurring in the very recent time like sudden flood, occasional deferred monsoon, bad harvest, 
experiment with new cash crop etc. On the other hand both political inclination and general awareness 
in this context are in no way sudden to the household and establishing direct non-association with 
current consumption, current income, current savings and current loan.  
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Econometric logic: 
Condition for Relevance: I checked this condition by test of significance (via F test) between proposed 
IVs and NREGSi i.e. no of person days worked since inception of the programme. Eventually I got 
statistically significant results in terms of association between IVs and the NREGSi. Moreover, Tobit 
estimates have already gave us such a hunch in section 4.2.2.2 
Condition for exogeneity: I checked this by looking at the statistically insignificant relation between 
IVs and the out come of interest.  
Test for Validity of IV:   Since this study proposes 3 IV for one endogenous regressor so it’s become 
over identified. Then I ran the Sargan- Hansen test for validity of these IVs. This test allowed me to 
comment that residuals of IV estimates is uncorrelated with the proposed IVs i.e. they are truly 
exogenous.  Apart from the chi-square Sargan-Hansen test statistics, exogeneity (and hence validity) is 
also evident from highly insignificant (extremely high ‘P’ value) relation between predicted residual 
of IV estimate and the proposed IVs. 
4.4.1.3 Interpretation of Results of IV regression of impact of Household’s economic status:  
 Table 22 shows the basic glimpses of the findings from IV estimation in comparison of the OLS to 
assessing the impact of NREGS days of work on log of monthly per-capita income (as lnmpi), on log 
of monthly per-capita consumption expenditure (as lnmpce), on total savings and on amount of loan or 
debt as remained outstanding. 
Table: 22 impact of NREGS on HH economic status (detail estimation results are in the Appendix: 3) 
 
Source: Calculated from field surveyed data by the author 
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To account for the simultaneous determination of the consumption expenditure (or income) and the 
number of days worked under NREGS I introduced the IV estimation technique with 3 IV said earlier. 
Table 22 shows that once I control for endogeneity across all measures of economic status of 
household the link is still insignificant. The point that emerges from this is that if one compares those 
who get a lot of work from NREGS with those who don’t there is no statistical discernible difference 
in the economic status of those who get more as compared to those who get less. If this is so that those 
who get more days are the same in terms of impact on economic status as those who get less then it 
tells us that in the absence of the programme the levels of consumption of the two groups would not 
differ. This suggests that in absence of the programme those who have more days from the programme 
would have got jobs elsewhere which would have allowed them to have same consumption as in a 
situation where they have jobs in NREGS. So the programme is not creating effectively any new jobs 
in terms of person-days instead it is substituting. Therefore it seems that NREGS is appearing as 
substitute means of employment not as complementing or newer source of jobs. But if this is so then 
why the households are participating or availing these jobs as a substitute source. Does it have any 
psychological advantage because of being a government’s guaranteed programme? Or is it providing 
any other benefit in terms of reducing stress or anxiety related to availability of jobs at any time? To 
examine this issue the next section will try to find out the impact of the NREGS on the ‘reduction of 
the stress’ related joblessness. 
 
4.4.2 Impact of ‘NREGS days of work since inception’ on ‘reduction of stress’ related to 
joblessness 
 
As mentioned earlier ordered probit regressions are used to investigate the effect of the NREGS 
programme on reducing job-related anxiety. Table 22 shows marginal effects for different samples. 
For the most part these effects are similar across the various samples and indicate that:  
1) Probability of out come-1 i.e. ‘reduction of stress=0’ to be 1 falls with an increase in the no. of 
days worked in the NREGS i.e. as household works for one extra day in the NREGS then it is 
less likely the case that ‘NREGS not at all reduces the stress or anxiety related to joblessness’.  
2) Probability of out come-2 i.e. ‘reduction of stress=1’ to be 1 is falling with the increase in the 
no. of days worked in the NREGS i.e. as the household works for one extra day in the NREGS 
then it is less likely the case that ‘NREGS reduces the stress or anxiety related to joblessness in 
to some extent’.  
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3) Probability of out come-3 i.e. ‘reduction of stress=2’ to be 1 is increasing with the increase in 
the no. of days worked in the NREGS i.e. as the household works for one extra day in the 
NREGS then it is more likely of the case that “NREGS reduces the stress or anxiety related to 
joblessness in a greater extent” .  
So this implies that with the participation in the NREGS, the likelihood of the incidence of stress or 
anxiety related to joblessness within the household reduces across all different combinations.  
Table: 23 Impact of NREGS on the reduction of stress (ordered probit estimate) (Appendix-4: detail results) 
 
Source: Calculated from field surveyed data by the author 
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4.4.3 Conclusions on impact. 
This subsection focused on the impact of the programme on economic and non-economic variable 
outcomes. The estimates showed that there is no significant impact of the NREGS on economic 
outcomes but there is a statistically significant impact on the reduction of stress. One possible 
explanation for the limited impact of the programme on economic outcomes is that the NREGS may 
not be creating any new jobs but substituting for existing jobs. Some of the information gathered 
during field work supports the idea that NREGS jobs provide a better working environment and 
individuals may prefer to move away from jobs in the private sector to an NREGS job. For instance, 
78.70% HH responded that NREGS providing a better work-side environment as compared to the jobs 
available in the open market. At the same time 66.39% of the respondents said even if there was no 
NREGS it would not matter as they would look (and find) available alternative jobs. These responses 
combined with the limited number of days provided by the NREGS as compared to the annual demand 
supports the idea that at the moment in Birbhum district the main contribution of the programme is not 
in terms of improving economic outcomes but providing better quality jobs (better work environment 
and higher daily wages rates than the market, Rs. 80 as against Rs. 65.08 for unskilled workers). The 
estimates suggest that unless the programme gets closer to its target of providing 100 days, its impact 
on improving economic outcomes is likely to be limited. Following case study from the field also 
supports the argument that the NREGS does have the potential of improving economic and social 
outcomes if it could be delivered in greater extent.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 56
Case Study-: Tulsi Bauri: A frustrated optimist woman. 
Tulsi Bauri, a widow of age around 60 living with her only son and their family in Bagdhori Mouza of Sansad-
III of Harisara GP, Sainthia Block, Birbhum District. This family has 6 heads, Tulsi and her son and daughter 
in-law and their 3 kids.  Besides being a Below Poverty Line HH, this HH does not posses any cultivable land 
or any kind of other income generating assets. Even after many attempts after the death of her husband, Tulsi 
did not manage to get the Widow Pension from the government. At present her son Ranjit, a 32 year old man is 
the only bread earner of this poor HH. Apart from occasional NREGS work through Panchayat, Ranjit manages 
to get job mainly from Stone Crasher Unit which is 4-6 kilometer away from this village. According to Tulsi, 
the daily wages in Crasher vary widely ranging from Rs. 30 to 300 in a day depending on availability of the 
workers on the spot on the very day. During the time of survey Tulsi was trying to convince us how vulnerable 
this job is and was asking us if we could do anything about it. Ranjit has to start his journey from home for 
Crasher work very early in the morning just to get an early contract there but for many days in a month such 
early departure eventually can not ensure a good deal or a deal at all at the end. When Tulsi was asked to 
response on the choice between NREGS work vis-à-vis Crasher as a source of livelihood, she was responding 
just instantly that Crasher made her child susceptible to many nuisance activities like alcoholism. Moreover, the 
dust of crasher created lung related problem to her son. Apart from that when Ranjit attends Crasher the women 
in the HH have to prepare food for Ranjit very early in the morning and have to wait till late evening to gather 
grocery for dinner and next day meal for all the members of the HH. According to Tulsi when Ranjit 
occasionally gets jobs in NREGS, he can work within the vicinity and come at home in lunch time. Moreover, 
the overall hour of work in NREGS is much lower compared to crasher though full day’s income in NREGS is 
less than the full day’s income in Crasher. When we asked why she prefers NREGS in spite of getting lesser 
wage, Tulsi replied that while working for NREGS, Ranjit does not have to walk for 2-3 hour to reach the work 
spot, neither any dust problem nor the option of having nuisance activity since they are then working in their 
own locality; nor any such uncertainty of getting job and finally no hurry in the morning to prepare food for 
Ranjit. But Tulsi was expressing annoyance with the situation in her village saying that if the member of the 
Panchayat pays little more attention to their village then her Ranjit could have got few more days of work under 
NREGS. During our survey it was revealed that for the last 6 months Ranjit could not manage to get even a 
single day of work under NREGS but worked for more than 50 days in Crasher. While returning from Bagdhori 
Village in the evening we met Ranjit; he was then coming from crasher with his fellow workers. Identifying us 
as outsiders they instantly started to grumble on why there is no NREGS work in this village when the near by 
‘Motipur’ is having it consistently. We apologized for not being able to give any specific reason. But in the 
midst of that twilight in the village concourse we witnessed a horde of frustrated rural youth looking for 
NREGS jobs.   
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion: 
This paper addressed 3 interrelated issues linked to India’s recently introduced and much heralded 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. The paper investigated the Targeting aspect, the 
Efficiency aspect of the PRI institution and the Impact aspect of the programme. Based on primary 
data collected from West Bengal’s Birbhum district in July-August 2009 the analysis presented in the 
paper showed that the programme is more likely to be accessed by poorer HH (defined in terms of 
land holdings, monthly per-capita income) and for the most part this self-targeted programme has been 
successful in reaching the poor. While the bulk of the benefits flow to vulnerable and poor households, 
the political inclination of a household plays a substantial role in household accessibility to the 
NREGS. It may be stated that while the programme is by and large accessed by the poor it is more 
likely that the poor who have a left political inclination are more likely to access the program while it 
is less likely to be accessed by the poor with left political alienation. Interestingly the findings showed 
that those who have no political inclination (do not vote and campaign) are least likely to access the 
programme, followed by those with a non-left inclination. The point is that political involvement of 
households plays an important role in determining access to NREGS jobs.  
As far as the efficiency of the implementing agency is concerned, the paper found that on average, 
since program inception, the time lag between commencement of work and payment of wages is 27 
days which may be compared with the statutory time lag of 15 days. In addition, while the annual 
demand for work is close to 200 days and legal obligation is 100 days, on average since inception 
programme has created 20 days in a year. Finally, analysis of the job creation patterns over the course 
of a year showed that the programme does not create more jobs during the lean season but that there is 
a tendency to spend more money at the fag end each financial year. While there are improvements 
over time but the analysis revealed a violation of clause and the spirit of the NREG Act and thereby 
undermines the potential of the programme in terms of serving as a safety net.   
Analysis of the impact of the programme on a range of economic outcomes showed that there was a 
statistically insignificant relationship between NREGS days of work and household economic status. 
The analysis relied on comparing outcomes across different control groups and used an IV strategy to 
control for the simultaneous determination of access to NREGS and economic outcomes. 
Notwithstanding such attempts it is possible that the statistically insignificant relationship may simply 
be driven by an inability to account for such a relationship.  
 58
There are other alternative interpretations on insignificant impact. First, the number of days created by 
the NREGS (about 20 person-days per year for the sample) may be considered too limited to have an 
impact on household economic status. Second, an alternative which receives some support from the 
field work is that the NREGS does not create any new jobs in terms of person-days, that is, households 
swap their present private sector jobs for NREGS work - 66.39% of the respondents said that even if 
there was no NREGS they would look (and find) available alternatives. While this may be the case, 
the analysis showed that NREGS jobs are still appreciated as greater accessibility to such jobs reduces 
stress or anxiety related to joblessness. At the same time another reason for moving away from 
available jobs to NREGS work could be the better work-site environment offered by NREGS work, a 
claim supported by close to 79% of the households in the sample. More widely, work substitution 
implies that participants do not really have ‘surplus labour’ and supports the idea, raised in the 
introduction, that poverty comes not from lack of activity but from not earning enough from activity. 
This means that their return to their labour is not determined by so-called fair returns to factors i.e. 
here the labour in the market. If we assume that for NREGS such unfair return to labour is not 
happening then there must be the case that it is not appearing in critical magnitude which is also 
evident from the field. Therefore, NREGS does not address this fundamental underlying structural 
driver of rural poverty, it could only try to offer some form of stop gap security, less uncertainty etc 
which are also yet to establish at least in the context of Birbhum district. The agonies of working poor 
are not being addressed structurally so far.   
  
Overall, while the NREGS programme of Birbhum District in West Bengal appears to be working well 
in terms of targeting and reaching a large number of poor households its main weakness appears to be 
the limited number of days of work that are generated through the programme and that there is little 
link between the lean period and the creation of jobs. Additional work days and projects that lead to 
the development of income-generating rural infrastructure are needed in order that the programme not 
only meets its objective of being a safety net but also in the long run sparking rural economic growth 
and contributing towards poverty reduction.  
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Glossary: Definition of few concepts  
01. Backward village:  
In 2004, in order to pin-point the fight against poverty, Govt. of West Bengal identified 4612 villages 
as  ‘backward villages’  on  the basis of the following indicators from Census 2001: A) female literacy 
(rural) < 30%, B) Marginal worker + non worker > 60 %. On the basis of these two criterion there are 
218 such Backward villages are spread over 167 GP in Birbhum district. 
02. Self-Evaluation: 
This is an evaluation process done by the GP them to evaluate their own performance on different 
issue. GPs assign their score on their own performance from a given scale with a maximum limit of 
100, so higher score implies better performing GP and higher (100- score) implies relatively bad 
performing or backward GP. So I took score away from 100 for after having average score for two 
consecutive years 2006-07 and 2007-08. 
03. Job Card 
The documents that an applicant have to have to get job under NREGS, the official registration 
number of each house hold under the scheme is mentioned here and this is like a small note book 
where information of days worked and wage earned are noted down. 
04. GUS 
GUS i.e. Gram Unnayan Samity is a people’s body encompassing few people at the village level 
constituency of each Gram Panchayat. It formed as per the instruction notified in the govt. notification. 
05. RHS Score 
RHS implies Rural Household Survey, 2005 done  by the Govt. of West Bengal. The score ranging 
from 12 to 60 based on 12 parameters each with 5 scales. Any household who are getting score below 
or equal to 33 are treated as officially Below Poverty Line (BPL) household at the Govt. level 
06. Household  
A 'household' is usually a group of persons who normally live together and take their meals from a 
common kitchen unless the exigencies of work prevent any of them from doing so. Persons in a 
household may be related or unrelated or a mix of both. However, if a group of unrelated persons live 
in a census house but do not take their meals from the common kitchen, then they are not constituent 
of a common household. Each such person was to be treated as a separate household. The important 
link in finding out whether it was a household or not was a common kitchen. There may be one 
member households, two member households or multi-member households.A household with at least 
 64
one Scheduled Caste member is treated as Scheduled Caste Household. Similarly, a household having 
at least one Scheduled Tribe member is treated as a Scheduled Tribe household. 
07. Head of the Household  
The head of household for census purposes is a person who is recognised as such by the household. 
She or he is generally the person who bears the chief responsibility for managing the affairs of the 
household and takes decision on behalf of the household. The head of household need not necessarily 
be the oldest male member or an earning member, but may be a female or a younger member of either 
sex. In case of an absentee de jure 'Head' who is not eligible to be enumerated in the household, the 
person on whom the responsibility of managing the affairs of household rests was to be regarded as 
the head irrespective whether the person is male or female. 
08. Main Workers  
Those workers who had worked for the major part of the reference period (i.e. 6 months or more) are 
termed as Main Workers. 
09. Marginal Workers  
Those workers who had not worked for the major part of the reference period (i.e. less than 6 months) 
are termed as Marginal Workers. 
10. Non Workers  
A person who did not at all work during the reference period was treated as non-worker. The non-
workers broadly constitute Students who did not participate in any economic activity paid or unpaid, 
household duties who were attending to daily household chores like cooking, cleaning utensils, 
looking after children, fetching water etc. and are not even helping in the unpaid work in the family 
form or cultivation or milching, dependant such as infants or very elderly people not included in the 
category of worker, pensioners those who are drawing pension after retirement and are not engaged in 
any economic activity. Beggars, vagrants, prostitutes and persons having unidentified source of 
income and with unspecified sources of subsistence and not engaged in any economically productive 
work during the reference period. Others, this category includes all Non-workers who may not come 
under the above categories such as rentiers, persons living on remittances, agricultural or non-
agricultural royalty, convicts in jails or inmates of penal, mental or charitable institutions doing no 
paid or unpaid work and persons who are seeking/available for work. 
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11. Sex Ratio  
Sex ratio has been defined as the number of females per 1000 males in the population. It is expressed 
as 'number of females per 1000 males'. 
 
Sex-ratio = 
Number of females 
----------------------    x 1000 
Number of males                     
12. Work Participation Rate  
Work participation rate is defined as the percentage of total workers (main and marginal) to total 
population 
Work participation rate 
= 
Total Workers (Main+ Marginal) 
------------------------------------x 100 
Total Population  
13. Migration 
Internal Migration It incldes any movement within the political boundaries of a nation which results in 
a change of usual place of residence. It may consist of the crossing of a village or town boundary as a 
minimum condition for qualifying the movement as internal migration. Thus, the concept of internal 
migration involves implicitly an imposition of boundary lines which must be crossed before a 
movement is counted as internal migratio 
14. Intra-district Migrant  
When a person moves out from his place of usual residence or birth to another politically defined area 
(village/town), which is within the district of enumeration, he/she is termed as an intra-district migrant.  
15. Inter-district Migrant 
A person who is in the course of migration crosses the boundary of the district of enumeration but 
remains within the State of enumeration, is termed as an inter-district migrant. 
16. Main Occupation:  
Occupation from where largest share of the income of the HH comes by using labour. 
17. Subsidiary Occupation:  
Other than main occupation from where any positive earning comes by using labour.  
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Appendix: 1 PROBIT REGRESSION 
 
Determinants of getting NREGS Job (YES/NO): coefficient & marginal effect (Specification-1)  
 
VARIABLES Probit dProbit X 
landholding -0.221*** -0.0624*** .873462 
 (0.0776) (0.0217)  
irrigatedland -0.129 -0.0365 .375086 
 (0.0926) (0.0263)  
Whether the HH lease in 
land (here leasein2 i.e. 
leasein yes is my 
reference category 
   
leasein1 -0.553** -0.134*** .796 
 (0.223) (0.0442)  
cattle 0.127** 0.0359** 1.41 
 (0.0514) (0.0146)  
mpce_nregp -0.000914*** -0.000258*** 762.232 
 (0.000266) (8.05e-05)  
Sex of the head of the HH 
(sex_HH1 i.e. female as 
head as the ref. 
category) 
   
sex_HH2 0.250 0.0760 .884 
 (0.214) (0.0696)  
Social Gr (caste) of the 
HH (here social_gr1&2 i.e 
general and Bramhin as 
the reference category) 
   
social_gr3 0.223 0.0578 .06 
 (0.285) (0.0673)  
social_gr4 0.622*** 0.168*** .418 
 (0.171) (0.0434)  
social_gr5 0.811 0.159*** .04 
 (0.498) (0.0576)  
Religion of the HH and 
the religion_nu2 i.e. 
muslim as the reference 
category)  
   
religion_nu1 -0.369* -0.0939** .814 
 (0.197) (0.0448)  
Constant 1.803***   
 (0.368)   
Observations 500 500  
R-squared .   
L1 -200.278   
Lo -276.687   
Peseudo R-Square 0.2762   
Getting NREGS Job 
Pr(nregs=1 at x-bar) 
 0.7969995  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Determinants of getting NREGS Job (YES/NO): Coefficient & Marginal effect (Specification-2)  
 
VARIABLES Probit dProbit X 
landholding -0.220*** -0.0611*** .873462 
 (0.0785) (0.0216)  
irrigatedland -0.145 -0.0402 .375086 
 (0.0949) (0.0264)  
Whether the HH lease in land (here 
leasein2 i.e. leasein yes is my 
reference category 
   
leasein1 -0.549** -0.131*** .796 
 (0.225) (0.0437)  
cattle 0.123** 0.0340** 1.41 
 (0.0523) (0.0146)  
mpce_nregp -0.000903*** -0.000251*** 762.232 
 (0.000254) (7.62e-05)  
Sex of the head of the HH (sex_HH1 
i.e. female as head as the ref. 
category) 
   
sex_HH2 0.205 0.0605 .884 
 (0.215) (0.0674)  
Social Gr (caste) of the HH (here 
social_gr1&2 i.e general and 
Bramhin as the reference category) 
   
social_gr3 0.145 0.0381 .06 
 (0.292) (0.0723)  
social_gr4 0.626*** 0.165*** .418 
 (0.171) (0.0431)  
social_gr5 0.755 0.148** .04 
 (0.499) (0.0606)  
Religion of the HH and the 
religion_nu2 i.e. muslim as the 
reference category)  
   
religion_nu1 -0.323 -0.0818* .814 
 (0.201) (0.0460)  
Voted to which party in the recent 
elections (voteleft as the 
reference categoty) 
   
votenonleft -0.156 -0.0444 .274 
 (0.197) (0.0577)  
novote -0.459*** -0.131** .41 
 (0.178) (0.0518)  
Constant 2.064***   
 (0.374)   
Observations 500 500  
R-squared .   
L1 -196.56164   
Lo -276.68717   
Peseudo R-Square 0.2896   
Getting NREGS Job Pr(nregs=1 at x-
bar) 
 0.8029286  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Determinants of getting NREGS Job (YES/NO): Coefficient & Marginal effect (Specification-3)  
VARIABLES Probit dProbit X 
landholding -0.230* -0.0332** .774301 
 (0.118) (0.0167)  
irrigatedland -0.190 -0.0274 .313741 
 (0.137) (0.0198)  
Whether the HH lease in land (here leasein2 i.e. leasein yes is my reference category    
leasein1 -0.682** -0.0761*** .776744 
 (0.284) (0.0237)  
cattle 0.0942 0.0136 1.3814 
 (0.0632) (0.00883)  
mpce_nregp -0.000846*** -
0.000122*** 
675.715 
 (0.000280) (4.49e-05)  
Sex of the head of the HH (sex_HH1 i.e. female as head as the ref. category)    
sex_HH2 0.209 0.0338 .881395 
 (0.254) (0.0452)  
Social Gr (caste) of the HH (here social_gr1&2 i.e general and Bramhin as the reference category)    
social_gr3 -0.0570 -0.00852 .053488 
 (0.387) (0.0600)  
social_gr4 0.331 0.0470 .45814 
 (0.222) (0.0313)  
social_gr5 0.258 0.0314 .046512 
 (0.525) (0.0527)  
Religion of the HH and the religion_nu2 i.e. muslim as the reference category)     
religion_nu1 -0.301 -0.0380 .813953 
 (0.261) (0.0288)  
Voted to which party in the recent elections (voteleft as the reference categoty)    
votenonleft -0.0165 -0.00240 .274419 
 (0.257) (0.0375)  
novote -0.416 -0.0641 .397674 
 (0.258) (0.0423)  
Whether any member of the Hh take part in the election campaign (here capaignN as the reference 
category.) 
   
campaignY 0.0765 0.0111 .546512 
 (0.247) (0.0360)  
Whether HH have any relative in the influential level (relativeofyourfamily 5 as ref. i.e. no relative)    
relativeofyourfamily1 0.129 0.0172 .07907 
 (0.382) (0.0468)  
relativeofyourfamily2 -0.696* -0.151 .044186 
 (0.376) (0.111)  
relativeofyourfamily3 0.486 0.0503 .034884 
 (0.900) (0.0597)  
relativeofyourfamily4 -0.00594 -0.000859 .025581 
 (0.538) (0.0782)  
Whether HH know the payment procedure (knowpaymentprocedure 2 i.e. don’t know as ref)    
knowpaymentprocedure1 0.564*** 0.0760*** .4 
 (0.181) (0.0244)  
Constant 2.443***   
 (0.498)   
Observations 430 430  
R-squared .   
L1 -117.18347   
Lo -168.22497   
Peseudo R-Square 0.3034   
Getting NREGS Job Pr(nregs=1 at x-bar)  0.923168  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Determinants of getting NREGS Job (YES/NO): coefficient & marginal effect (Specification-4) 
 
VARIABLES Probit dprobit X 
Landholding -0.194* -0.0286* .769525 
 (0.116) (0.0169)  
irrigatedland -0.192 -0.0283 .312688 
 (0.136) (0.0202)  
Whether the HH lease in land (here 
leasein2 i.e. leasein yes is my 
reference category 
   
leasein1 -0.508* -0.0618** .775744 
 (0.268) (0.0267)  
Whether the HH hired labour for 
cultivation (hire_lab_cult1 i.e. not 
hiring as the reference category) 
   
hire_lab_cult2 0.119 0.0172 .391304 
 (0.212) (0.0302)  
Cattle 0.0905 0.0133 1.373 
 (0.0662) (0.00952)  
mpce_nregp -0.000692*** -0.000102*** 676.103 
 (0.000249) (3.96e-05)  
Whether the HH has the access of 
mobile or ph (pnone1 i.e. no phone is 
the reference category) 
   
phone2 0.626*** 0.111** .707094 
 (0.210) (0.0443)  
Whether the HH own a house (owner_H2 
i.e. having house as ref. category) 
   
owner_H1 -0.213 -0.0352 .114416 
 (0.278) (0.0509)  
Sex of Head of HH(sex_HH1 i.e. female 
as reference category) 
   
sex_HH2 0.376 0.0674 .881007 
 (0.244) (0.0515)  
Voted to which party in the recent elections (voteleft as the 
reference categoty) 
   
votenonleft -0.0816 -0.0124 .272311 
 (0.251) (0.0390)  
Novote -0.379* -0.0593 .400458 
 (0.222) (0.0366)  
Whether HH know the payment procedure 
(knowpaymentprocedure 2 i.e. don’t know as ref) 
   
knowpaymentprocedure1 0.597*** 0.0819*** .395881 
 (0.180) (0.0244)  
Constant 1.499***   
 (0.469)   
Observations 437   
R-squared .   
L1 -121.28733   
Lo -171.09889   
Peseudo R-Square 0.2911   
Getting NREGS Job Pr(nregs=1 at x-bar)  0.9208001  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Determinants of getting NREGS Job (YES/NO): coefficient & marginal effect (Specification-5) 
VARIABLES Probit dprobit X 
Landholding -0.0334 -0.00383 .748026 
 (0.146) (0.0167)  
irrigatedland -0.276 -0.0316 .336899 
 (0.177) (0.0201)  
Whether the HH lease in land (here 
leasein2 i.e. leasein yes is my 
reference category 
   
leasein1 -0.346 -0.0341 .781457 
 (0.354) (0.0298)  
Whether the HH hired labour for 
cultivation (hire_lab_cult1 i.e. not 
hiring as the reference category) 
   
hire_lab_cult2 0.292 0.0319 .384106 
 (0.275) (0.0283)  
Cattle 0.102 0.0117 1.39404 
 (0.0749) (0.00851)  
mpce_nregp -0.000581** -6.65e-05** 635.436 
 (0.000244) (3.00e-05)  
Whether the HH has the mobile or ph 
(pnone1 i.e. no phone is the 
reference category) 
   
phone2 0.750*** -6.65e-05** .725166 
 (0.264) (3.00e-05)  
Whether the HH own a house (owner_H2 
i.e. having house as ref. category) 
   
owner_H1 -0.156 -0.0196 .102649 
 (0.381) (0.0526)  
Sex of Head of HH(sex_HH1 i.e. 
female as reference category) 
   
sex_HH2 0.507 0.0796 .907285 
 (0.331) (0.0664)  
Voted to which party in the recent elections (voteleft as the 
reference categoty) 
   
votenonleft 0.0218 0.00248 .274834 
 (0.313) (0.0354)  
Novote -0.193 -0.0227 .413907 
 (0.278) (0.0337)  
Whether HH know the payment procedure 
(knowpaymentprocedure 2 i.e. don’t know as ref) 
   
knowpaymentprocedure1 0.844*** 0.0922*** .430464 
 (0.218) (0.0263)  
rhsscore -0.0370** -0.00424** 34.4801 
 (0.0154) (0.00168)  
Constant 2.081**   
 (0.815)   
Observations 302 302  
R-squared .   
L1 -75.212473   
Lo -110.33226   
Peseudo R-Square 0.3183   
Getting NREGS Job Pr(nregs=1 at x-bar)  .9428941  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix-2 TOBIT REGRESSION  
Determinants of NREGS Job in terms of days since inception (Specification-1) 
 
 
Marginal Effect after Tobit 
VARIABLES 
 
Days Tobit 
(co-
efficient)
Pr.(Yi>0) E(Yi/Yi>0) E(Yi) 
X 
landholding -2.452 -0.0142159 -1.250583 -1.768697 .873462 
 (3.689) (0.02141)   (1.88018) (2.65934)  
irrigatedland -8.946* -0.0518748* -4.56346* -6.454094* .375086 
 (5.284) (0.03062) (2.69456) (3.81035)  
cattle 4.357** 0.0252649** 2.222567** 3.143373** 1.41 
 (2.019) (0.01165) (1.02529) (1.45059)  
mpce_nregp -0.0511*** -0.0002964*** -
o.0260778*
** 
-
.0368818**
* 
762.232 
 (0.0119) (0.00007) (o.00573) (.00817)  
Sex of head of HH 
(sex_HH1 i.e. female 
as head of HH s the 
reference category) 
     
sex_HH2 13.70 0.0833084 6.650154* 9.450274* .884 
 (8.520) (0.05377) (3.92873) (5.59548)  
Social Group (Caste) 
of the HH (here 
social_gr1&2 i.e. 
general and Brahmin 
as the reference 
category) 
     
social_gr3 -0.584 -0.0033945 3.92873 -.4203631 .06 
 (12.83) (0.0748) (6.51516) (9.22063)  
social_gr4 34.90*** 0.194579*** 18.32162**
* 
25.63967**
* 
.418 
 (7.485) (0.03969) (4.11326) (5.64018)  
social_gr5 48.71*** 0.2084017*** 30.3022** 40.32748** .418 
 (17.35) (0.04727) (12.828) (15.857)  
Religion of the HH 
and the religion_nu2 
i.e. Muslim as the 
reference category) 
     
religion_nu1 -13.67* -0.0755965* -7.261231* -10.18983* .814 
 (7.979) (0.04215) (4.40191) 6.12055  
Constant 54.84***     
 (11.85)     
Observations 500     
Left censored (at 
Yi<=0) 
130     
Uncensored  370     
L1 -2119.5673     
Lo -2196.1694     
(Pseudo) R-square 0.0349     
R-squared .     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Determinants of NREGS Job in terms of days since inception (Specification-2) 
 
 
 
Marginal Effect after Tobit 
VARIABLES 
 
Days Tobit 
(co-
efficient)
Pr.(Yi>0) E(Yi/Yi>0) E(Yi) 
X 
landholding -2.875 -.0170218 -1.483229 -2.09404 .873462 
 (3.608) (0.02137) (1.85825) (2.62414)  
irrigatedland -7.906 -.0468112 -4.078986 -5.758761 .375086 
 (5.139) (0.03046) (2.65161) (3.74293)  
cattle 3.094 .0183178 1.596159 2.253476 1.41 
 (2.017) (0.01189) (1.03587) (1.46333)  
mpce_nregp -0.0467*** -.0002764*** -.0240887*** -.0340088*** 762.232 
 (0.0109) (0.00007) (0.00532) (0.00757)  
Sex of head of HH (sex_HH1 i.e. female as head 
of HH is the reference category)  
   
sex_HH2 8.278 .0506245 4.141325 5.870205 .884 
 (8.361) (0.05257) (4.05093) (5.76023)  
Social Group (Caste) of the HH (here 
social_gr1&2 i.e. general and Brahmin as the 
reference category) 
   
social_gr3 -10.85 -.067311 -5.341632 -7.582844 .06 
 (12.15) (0.07856) (5.71755) (8.14414)  
social_gr4 33.31*** .1896703*** 17.6787*** 24.69518*** .418 
 (7.272) (0.03975) (4.02772) (5.51413)  
social_gr5 36.92** .1730817*** 22.29664** 30.07994** .04 
 (15.66) (0.05347) (10.927) (13.936)  
Religion of the HH and the religion_nu2 i.e. 
Muslim as the reference category) 
   
religion_nu1 -8.912 -.0510954 -4.724193 -6.635121 .814 
 (8.013) (0.04457) (4.36086) (6.08885)  
‘Voteleft’ during last election as ref. category    
votenonleft -15.12** -.0925209** -7.547332** -10.69137** .274 
 (6.862) (.04266) (3.3447) (4.73854)  
novote -24.85*** -.1498046*** -12.56139*** -17.72932*** .41 
 (6.673) (0.03987) (3.35608) (4.70566)  
Whether HH know the Payment procedure 
‘Knowpaymentprocedure2’ i.e. do’t know as the 
ref category. 
   
knowpaymentprocedure1 22.57*** .1279556*** 12.04905*** 16.86235*** .346 
 (5.401) (0.02975) (2.97084) (4.10757)  
Constant 62.46***     
 (12.25)     
Observations 500     
Left censored (at 
Yi<=0) 
130     
Uncensored  370     
L1 -2102.6205     
Lo -2196.1694     
(Pseudo) R-square 0.0426     
R-squared      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 , Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Determinants of NREGS Job in terms of days since inception (Specification-3) 
 
Marginal Effect after Tobit 
VARIABLES 
 
Days Tobit 
(co-
efficient) 
Days OLS 
(co-
efficient) Pr.(Yi>0) E(Yi/Yi>0) E(Yi) 
X 
landholding -4.014 -0.278 -.023972 -2.09569 -2.952848 .873462 
 (3.861) (2.440) (0.02305) (2.00909) (2.83224)  
irrigatedland -5.175 -2.883 -.0309069 -2.701954 -3.80708 .375086 
 (4.878) (2.688) (0.02919) (2.54755) (3.58909)  
Whether the HH lease in land.(here leasein1 i.e. not lease in as reference category)  
leasein2 9.667 8.233 .0557491 5.190979 7.271237 .204 
 (7.128) (6.097) (0.03958) (3.93536) (5.47503)  
Whether HH hired Lab for cultivation. (here hire_lab_cult1 i.e. not hired as the reference category)  
hire_lab_cult2 2.489 -1.595 .0148296 1.302329 1.834264 .416 
 (6.905) (5.247) (0.04103) (3.61839) (5.09449)  
cattle 3.813* 1.943 .0227743* 1.99098 2.805312 1.41 
 (1.995) (1.506) (0.01186) (1.0381) (1.46325)  
mpce_nregp -0.0347*** -0.00851*** -
.0002069*** 
-
.0180917*** 
-.0254914*** 762.232 
 (0.00983) (0.00256) (0.00006) (0.00496) (0.00703)  
Sex of head of HH (sex_HH1 i.e. female as head of HH is the reference category)  
sex_HH2 8.717 7.363 .0539636 4.403212 6.233332 .884 
 (8.237) (6.587) (0.0526) (4.01842) (5.71022)  
Social Group (Caste) of the HH (here social_gr1&2 i.e. general and Brahmin as the reference category)  
social_gr3 -8.193 -7.033 -.0508569 -4.127634 -5.845519 .06 
 (11.08) (7.433) (0.07109) (5.38661) (7.65817)  
social_gr4 24.87*** 19.39*** .144317*** 13.2625*** 18.55258*** .418 
 (7.839) (6.209) (0.04409) (4.30223) (5.94249)  
social_gr5 28.57* 27.79** .1421268** 16.90248* 23.00274* .04 
 (15.28) (13.96) (0.06014) (10.166) (13.261)  
Religion of the HH and the religion_nu2 i.e. Muslim as the reference category)   
religion_nu1 -5.026 -1.496 -.0294571 -2.665004 -3.743791 .814 
 (8.135) (5.942) (0.04684) (4.3797) (6.13279)  
‘Voteleft’ during last election as ref. category  
votenonleft -14.11** -12.40** -.0871184** -7.141567** -10.10032** .274 
 (6.647) (5.470) (0.04188) (3.28367) (4.64767)  
novote -21.55*** -18.05*** -.130987** -
11.04913*** 
-15.57478*** .41 
 (8.014) (6.427) (0.04893) (4.04841) (5.68754)  
Whether HH know the Payment procedure ‘Knowpaymentprocedure2’ i.e. do’t know as the ref category.  
knowpaymentprocedure1 24.08*** 15.81*** .1369325*** 13.04748*** 18.19545*** .346 
 (5.307) (4.533) (0.02917) (2.96166) (4.07453)  
Whether the HH has the ph or mb, here phone1 i.e. having the phone as the 
reference category 
   
phone2 29.86*** 23.55*** .1854157*** 14.94966*** 21.09022*** .648 
 (7.226) (5.377) (0.04601) (3.50348) (4.90692)  
Whether any member from the HH took part in the least election campaign, here campaign i.e. not 
participated as the ref. category. 
 
campaignY 0.344 -1.190 .0020521 .179375 .2527443 .522 
 (7.007) (5.655) (0.04186) (3.65786) (5.15405)  
Constant 28.16* 29.08***     
 (15.68) (10.69)     
Observations 500 500     
Left censored (atYi<=0) 130      
Uncensored  370      
L1 -2091.0969      
Lo -2196.1694      
(Pseudo) R-square 0.0478      
R-squared  0.258     
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Determinants of NREGS Job in terms of days since inception (Specification-4) 
 
Tobit Marginal Effect  VARIABLES OLS Tobit Pr.(Yi>0) E(Yi/Yi>0) E(Yi) X 
landholding -1.868 -5.784 -.0361169 -3.0964 -4.342189 .873462 
 (2.309) (3.637) (0.02272) (1.94094) (2.72306)  
irrigatedland -3.514 -6.594 -.0411765 -3.530178 -4.950492 .375086 
 (2.869) (4.970) (0.03109) (2.66226) (3.73241)  
Whether the HH lease in land.(here leasein1 i.e. not lease in as reference category)  
leasein2 14.53** 18.02*** .1040343*** 10.19712** 14.08727*** .204 
 (5.739) (6.634) (0.03484) (3.96803) (5.38038)  
Whether HH hired Lab for cultivation. (here hire_lab_cult1 i.e.not hired as ref category)  
hire_lab_cult2 -3.051 -0.382 -.0023892 -.2046802 -.2870496 .416 
 (4.972) (6.395) (0.03996) (3.42185) (4.79908)  
cattle 1.045 3.026 .0188932 1.619764  2.271452 1.41 
 (1.481) (1.871) (0.01165) (0.99791) (1.40021)  
mpce_nregp -0.00972*** -0.0361*** -.0002252*** -.0193049*** -.027072*** 762.232 
 (0.00286) (0.00946) (0.00006) (0.00484) (0.00685)  
Sex of head of HH (sex_HH1 i.e. female as head of HH is the reference category)  
sex_HH2 4.602 5.329 .0341539 2.79189 3.930646 .884 
 (6.426) (7.927) (0.05203) (4.059) (5.73602)  
Who inform you most about the any new schemes: who_informed_most_newschemes4 as the ref.  
who_informed_most_newscheme1 17.49*** 28.39*** .1591698*** 16.34816*** 22.41618*** .252 
 (4.957) (6.425) (0.03253) (3.92956) (5.24627)  
who_informed_most_newscheme2 20.17*** 31.67*** .180492*** 18.03086*** 24.77292*** .314 
 (5.116) (6.451) (0.03345) (3.87773) (5.18699)  
who_informed_most_newscheme3 23.15*** 36.49*** .1773002*** 22.74315** 30.31555*** .08 
 (8.541) (10.48) (0.0374) (7.40205) (9.32943)  
Social Group(Caste) of HH (here social_gr1&2 i.e.general and Brahmin as ref. category)  
social_gr3 -3.856 -1.844 -.0116353 -.978608 -1.374641 .06 
 (7.830) (11.19) (0.07134) (5.89211) (8.28963)  
social_gr4 21.54*** 26.80*** .1614713*** 14.69682*** 20.41461*** .418 
 (5.578) (7.184) (0.04209) (4.08863) (5.57883)  
social_gr5 27.07* 27.69* .1411746** 16.85014* 22.71451* .04 
 (14.94) (16.33) (0.06401) (11.178) (14.389)  
Religion of the HH and the religion_nu2 i.e. Muslim as the reference category)  
religion_nu1 -4.072 -8.827 -.0530069 -4.863482 -6.773536 .814 
 (5.772) (7.902) (0.04571) (4.49233) (6.20451)  
‘Voteleft’ during last election as ref. category  
votenonleft -12.81** -13.34** -.086417** -6.92146** -9.752065** .274 
 (5.433) (6.685) (0.04436) (3.38468) (4.7759)  
Novote -19.90*** -23.49*** -.1499513*** -12.31406*** -17.2786*** .41 
 (5.795) (7.054) (.04517) (3.64096) (5.08338)  
Whether HH know Payment procedure:Knowpaymentprocedure2’ i.e.do’t know as ref. category.  
knowpaymentprocedure1 12.33*** 18.96*** .1133871*** 10.46823*** 14.54846*** .346 
 (4.460) (5.164) (0.02976) (2.93018) (4.02476)  
Whether any member from HH took part in least election campaign,here campaign i.e. not participated as ref.category.  
campaignY -3.814 -3.316 -.0206858 -1.77674 -2.491014 .522 
 (5.296) (6.391) (0.03985) (3.42399) (4.79978)  
Block effect: here most advance block Bolpur-Santinikatan i.e. blocknum1 as ref. category  
blocknum2 16.55* 15.69 .0886632* 8.996616 12.38753 .072 
 (9.226) (10.62) (0.0533) (6.53739) (8.80384)  
blocknum3 -24.17*** -29.18*** -.2064448** -13.68392*** -19.39257*** .072 
 (8.690) (10.99) (0.08566) (4.50335) (6.32854)  
blocknum4 -4.475 -2.360 -.0148728 -1.25453 -1.761759 .208 
 (7.280) (8.880) (0.05659) (4.68549) (6.58883)  
blocknum5 -28.07*** -32.15*** -.2255595*** -15.20612*** 6.58883*** .134 
 (6.379) (8.444) (0.06447) (3.55586) (4.97859)  
blocknum6 -6.250 -8.778 -.0567963 -4.561154 -6.428906 .176 
 (7.675) (9.277) (0.06228) (4.67804) (6.62026)  
blocknum7 -24.14*** -37.46*** -.2701686*** -16.9203*** -23.89941*** .072 
 (9.314) (12.52) (0.09761) (4.68812) (6.45123)  
blocknum8 16.33* 21.51** .1200475** 12.43019** 17.05832** .154 
 (8.530) (9.960) (0.04823) (6.19994) (8.28921)  
Constant 47.37*** 47.03***     
 (11.53) (15.19)     
Observations 500 500     
R-squared 0.341      
Left censored (atYi<=0)  130     
Uncensored   370     
L1  -2056.9475     
Lo  -2196.1694     
(Pseudo) R-square  0.0634     
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix -3: Regression results on HH level economic status (income, consumption, savings, income) 
Result-1: Impact of  NREGS on log of Monthly per-capita income (lnmpi) with different 
combination of HH under OLS 
 VARIABLES With all HH With HH with 
Job-card 
With HH who 
applied job 
With HH finally 
 got job  
nregpwork_days_inception -0.00172*** -0.000722 -0.000398 -0.000241 
 (0.000519) (0.000499) (0.000499) (0.000516) 
landholding 0.0260 -0.0304 -0.0157 -0.0110 
 (0.0333) (0.0315) (0.0307) (0.0328) 
irrigatedland 0.0841* 0.174*** 0.111** 0.104* 
 (0.0443) (0.0403) (0.0555) (0.0612) 
hire_lab_cult2 0.168** 0.174*** 0.167** 0.168** 
 (0.0703) (0.0659) (0.0663) (0.0690) 
cattle 0.00870 0.0422** 0.0452** 0.0487*** 
 (0.0187) (0.0175) (0.0179) (0.0184) 
sex_HH2 0.225* 0.278** 0.323** 0.321** 
 (0.133) (0.125) (0.132) (0.134) 
unmarried_HH 0.561*** 0.868*** 0.909*** 0.922*** 
 (0.186) (0.218) (0.224) (0.218) 
widow_HH 0.410*** 0.436*** 0.452*** 0.457*** 
 (0.128) (0.120) (0.131) (0.132) 
edu2 0.0311 0.0628 0.0517 0.0520 
 (0.0655) (0.0637) (0.0643) (0.0656) 
edu3 0.193** 0.188** 0.154** 0.135* 
 (0.0822) (0.0732) (0.0722) (0.0745) 
edu4 0.304** 0.163 0.150 0.124 
 (0.127) (0.116) (0.120) (0.125) 
edu5 0.771*** 0.600*** 0.634*** 0.636** 
 (0.178) (0.227) (0.242) (0.281) 
edu6 0.945*** 0.476*** 0.344* 0.352* 
 (0.173) (0.156) (0.182) (0.183) 
social_gr3 -0.0169 -0.00306 -0.0618 -0.0728 
 (0.149) (0.109) (0.0870) (0.0900) 
social_gr4 -0.184** -0.0840 -0.103 -0.0992 
 (0.0815) (0.0775) (0.0773) (0.0819) 
social_gr5 -0.351*** -0.287** -0.289** -0.294** 
 (0.130) (0.139) (0.141) (0.143) 
religion_nu1 0.131 0.0533 0.0598 0.0644 
 (0.0995) (0.0911) (0.0907) (0.0971) 
blocknum2 -0.180 -0.135 -0.145 -0.140 
 (0.122) (0.123) (0.124) (0.127) 
blocknum3 -0.309*** -0.157 -0.196* -0.210* 
 (0.107) (0.106) (0.109) (0.110) 
blocknum4 0.00959 0.0673 0.0548 0.0394 
 (0.0995) (0.0941) (0.0984) (0.0995) 
blocknum5 0.0875 0.0381 0.0719 0.0790 
 (0.118) (0.0989) (0.102) (0.106) 
blocknum6 0.0274 -0.00660 -0.000991 0.00226 
 (0.0991) (0.0941) (0.0959) (0.0982) 
blocknum7 0.0645 0.198 0.0462 0.0532 
 (0.149) (0.145) (0.134) (0.135) 
blocknum8 -0.0201 -0.0226 -0.00712 -0.00396 
 (0.0894) (0.0838) (0.0862) (0.0879) 
Constant 5.951*** 5.759*** 5.706*** 5.683*** 
 (0.170) (0.151) (0.157) (0.160) 
Observations 500 423 395 379 
R-squared 0.409 0.332 0.271 0.260 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Result-2: Impact of  NREGS on log of Monthly per-capita income (lnmpi) with different 
combination of HH under IV estimation technique. 
VARIABLES With all HH With HH with 
Job-card 
With HH who 
applied job 
With HH finally 
 got job  
     
nregpwork_days_inception -0.00453* -0.00222 -0.000560 0.000498 
 (0.00253) (0.00250) (0.00261) (0.00302) 
landholding 0.0302 -0.0248 -0.0151 -0.0147 
 (0.0362) (0.0384) (0.0383) (0.0416) 
irrigatedland 0.0711 0.163*** 0.111* 0.106 
 (0.0458) (0.0526) (0.0643) (0.0686) 
hire_lab_cult2 0.159** 0.165** 0.166** 0.174** 
 (0.0717) (0.0656) (0.0661) (0.0695) 
cattle 0.0128 0.0441** 0.0454** 0.0477** 
 (0.0201) (0.0182) (0.0184) (0.0189) 
sex_HH2 0.239 0.289** 0.323** 0.317** 
 (0.146) (0.130) (0.127) (0.130) 
unmarried_HH 0.498** 0.834*** 0.905*** 0.943*** 
 (0.249) (0.243) (0.237) (0.246) 
widow_HH 0.367*** 0.422*** 0.451*** 0.464*** 
 (0.141) (0.122) (0.123) (0.126) 
edu2 -0.00463 0.0410 0.0496 0.0609 
 (0.0853) (0.0760) (0.0729) (0.0757) 
edu3 0.134 0.157 0.151 0.146 
 (0.109) (0.0975) (0.0941) (0.0942) 
edu4 0.205 0.112 0.144 0.146 
 (0.145) (0.135) (0.138) (0.146) 
edu5 0.658*** 0.555*** 0.630*** 0.648*** 
 (0.177) (0.172) (0.168) (0.176) 
edu6 0.815*** 0.410** 0.339* 0.376* 
 (0.174) (0.176) (0.192) (0.200) 
social_gr3 -0.0143 -0.00523 -0.0620 -0.0699 
 (0.127) (0.114) (0.121) (0.127) 
social_gr4 -0.136 -0.0623 -0.100 -0.110 
 (0.0928) (0.0826) (0.0847) (0.0906) 
social_gr5 -0.250 -0.244 -0.284* -0.315* 
 (0.184) (0.153) (0.154) (0.161) 
religion_nu1 0.139 0.0533 0.0596 0.0653 
 (0.0960) (0.0878) (0.0880) (0.0929) 
blocknum2 -0.135 -0.114 -0.143 -0.152 
 (0.144) (0.124) (0.120) (0.126) 
blocknum3 -0.379** -0.199 -0.201 -0.191 
 (0.150) (0.139) (0.141) (0.146) 
blocknum4 0.0131 0.0657 0.0548 0.0390 
 (0.106) (0.0930) (0.0911) (0.0931) 
blocknum5 0.00937 -0.0135 0.0663 0.103 
 (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.145) 
blocknum6 0.0188 -0.00974 -0.00141 0.00173 
 (0.111) (0.0996) (0.0980) (0.101) 
blocknum7 -0.00588 0.157 0.0422 0.0705 
 (0.151) (0.141) (0.147) (0.152) 
blocknum8 0.0129 -0.00640 -0.00518 -0.0146 
 (0.117) (0.102) (0.102) (0.109) 
Constant 6.107*** 5.853*** 5.717*** 5.636*** 
 (0.230) (0.222) (0.229) (0.249) 
Observations 500 423 395 379 
R-squared 0.383 0.320 0.271 0.256 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Result-3: Impact of NREGS on log of Monthly per-capita consumption expenditure (lnmpce) with 
different combination of HH under OLS estimation technique. 
VARIABLES With all HH With HH with 
Job-card 
With HH who 
applied job 
With HH finally 
 got job  
     
nregpwork_days_inception -0.00153*** -0.000833* -0.000539 -0.000407 
 (0.000447) (0.000455) (0.000472) (0.000488) 
landholding -0.0204 -0.0114 -0.00408 0.000608 
 (0.0226) (0.0257) (0.0265) (0.0280) 
irrigatedland 0.0595* 0.0605 0.0385 0.0405 
 (0.0337) (0.0404) (0.0514) (0.0565) 
hire_lab_cult2 0.145*** 0.129** 0.127** 0.119** 
 (0.0533) (0.0508) (0.0500) (0.0506) 
cattle 0.00534 0.0109 0.0121 0.0142 
 (0.0153) (0.0138) (0.0142) (0.0143) 
sex_HH2 0.169* 0.165* 0.191** 0.189** 
 (0.0960) (0.0885) (0.0911) (0.0924) 
unmarried_HH 0.223 0.396 0.427* 0.439* 
 (0.169) (0.245) (0.258) (0.258) 
widow_HH 0.255*** 0.242*** 0.250*** 0.249*** 
 (0.0884) (0.0790) (0.0825) (0.0835) 
edu2 0.0278 0.0499 0.0436 0.0348 
 (0.0511) (0.0507) (0.0518) (0.0527) 
edu3 0.132** 0.128** 0.117* 0.0947 
 (0.0621) (0.0604) (0.0606) (0.0597) 
edu4 0.187** 0.141 0.110 0.103 
 (0.0906) (0.0924) (0.0869) (0.0918) 
edu5 0.501*** 0.347** 0.339** 0.315* 
 (0.129) (0.150) (0.159) (0.186) 
edu6 0.661*** 0.355*** 0.239 0.227 
 (0.130) (0.122) (0.163) (0.163) 
social_gr3 0.0255 0.0295 0.0157 0.0168 
 (0.115) (0.0961) (0.0839) (0.0877) 
social_gr4 -0.132** -0.0988 -0.106 -0.124* 
 (0.0610) (0.0643) (0.0677) (0.0702) 
social_gr5 -0.211** -0.185* -0.209** -0.228** 
 (0.0995) (0.100) (0.101) (0.102) 
religion_nu1 0.0331 0.0175 0.0140 0.0314 
 (0.0709) (0.0695) (0.0726) (0.0778) 
blocknum2 -0.228** -0.186** -0.194** -0.193** 
 (0.0893) (0.0869) (0.0880) (0.0887) 
blocknum3 -0.216** -0.0993 -0.120 -0.117 
 (0.0951) (0.0957) (0.0926) (0.0954) 
blocknum4 -0.0592 -0.0121 -0.0250 -0.0433 
 (0.0820) (0.0766) (0.0793) (0.0797) 
blocknum5 0.00457 0.0258 0.0481 0.0638 
 (0.0885) (0.0809) (0.0838) (0.0867) 
blocknum6 -0.116 -0.0933 -0.0792 -0.0786 
 (0.0810) (0.0733) (0.0749) (0.0762) 
blocknum7 -0.296*** -0.165* -0.210** -0.209** 
 (0.100) (0.0925) (0.0947) (0.0947) 
blocknum8 -0.0270 0.0104 -0.00298 0.00142 
 (0.0767) (0.0728) (0.0753) (0.0770) 
Constant 6.297*** 6.178*** 6.142*** 6.131*** 
 (0.126) (0.110) (0.113) (0.116) 
Observations 500 423 395 379 
R-squared 0.331 0.226 0.193 0.189 
Robust standard errors 
in parentheses 
    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Result-4: Impact of NREGS on log of Monthly per-capita consumption expenditure (lnmpce) with 
different combination of HH under IV estimation technique. 
VARIABLES With all HH With HH with 
Job-card 
With HH who 
applied job 
With HH finally 
 got job  
     
nregpwork_days_inception -0.00583*** -0.00273 -0.00126 -0.000276 
 (0.00206) (0.00203) (0.00213) (0.00243) 
landholding -0.0139 -0.00429 -0.00119 -4.38e-05 
 (0.0295) (0.0313) (0.0313) (0.0335) 
irrigatedland 0.0396 0.0467 0.0375 0.0408 
 (0.0372) (0.0428) (0.0525) (0.0553) 
hire_lab_cult2 0.130** 0.118** 0.121** 0.120** 
 (0.0583) (0.0534) (0.0540) (0.0561) 
cattle 0.0117 0.0134 0.0132 0.0140 
 (0.0163) (0.0148) (0.0150) (0.0152) 
sex_HH2 0.190 0.180* 0.194* 0.189* 
 (0.119) (0.106) (0.104) (0.105) 
unmarried_HH 0.126 0.353* 0.409** 0.442** 
 (0.202) (0.198) (0.194) (0.199) 
widow_HH 0.189* 0.224** 0.243** 0.250** 
 (0.114) (0.0993) (0.100) (0.102) 
edu2 -0.0268 0.0223 0.0343 0.0364 
 (0.0694) (0.0619) (0.0596) (0.0610) 
edu3 0.0411 0.0887 0.104 0.0965 
 (0.0887) (0.0793) (0.0769) (0.0759) 
edu4 0.0348 0.0753 0.0865 0.107 
 (0.118) (0.110) (0.113) (0.118) 
edu5 0.329** 0.291** 0.320** 0.317** 
 (0.144) (0.140) (0.138) (0.142) 
edu6 0.462*** 0.271* 0.215 0.231 
 (0.141) (0.143) (0.157) (0.162) 
social_gr3 0.0294 0.0267 0.0151 0.0173 
 (0.103) (0.0930) (0.0992) (0.103) 
social_gr4 -0.0587 -0.0714 -0.0947 -0.126* 
 (0.0755) (0.0672) (0.0692) (0.0730) 
social_gr5 -0.0575 -0.131 -0.187 -0.232* 
 (0.150) (0.125) (0.126) (0.130) 
religion_nu1 0.0454 0.0174 0.0134 0.0316 
 (0.0781) (0.0715) (0.0719) (0.0749) 
blocknum2 -0.160 -0.159 -0.183* -0.195* 
 (0.117) (0.101) (0.0983) (0.102) 
blocknum3 -0.324*** -0.152 -0.140 -0.113 
 (0.122) (0.113) (0.115) (0.118) 
blocknum4 -0.0538 -0.0142 -0.0250 -0.0433 
 (0.0863) (0.0757) (0.0744) (0.0750) 
blocknum5 -0.115 -0.0395 0.0235 0.0680 
 (0.112) (0.111) (0.112) (0.117) 
blocknum6 -0.129 -0.0972 -0.0811 -0.0787 
 (0.0906) (0.0810) (0.0801) (0.0811) 
blocknum7 -0.404*** -0.217* -0.228* -0.206* 
 (0.122) (0.115) (0.120) (0.123) 
blocknum8 0.0236 0.0308 0.00563 -0.000460 
 (0.0951) (0.0833) (0.0835) (0.0880) 
Constant 6.536*** 6.297*** 6.189*** 6.123*** 
 (0.187) (0.180) (0.187) (0.200) 
Observations 500 423 395 379 
R-squared 0.213 0.189 0.187 0.189 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Result-5: Impact of NREGS on Total Loan or debt (loan) with different combination of HH under 
OLS estimation technique. 
VARIABLES With all HH With HH with 
Job-card 
With HH who 
applied job 
With HH finally 
 got job  
     
nregpwork_days_inception -29.57 -26.55 -26.60 -13.49 
 (27.86) (28.49) (29.69) (27.02) 
landholding 7698** 3682 3852 1338 
 (3127) (2682) (2839) (1451) 
irrigatedland -4199 -4411 -3974 1009 
 (4460) (4217) (5174) (2818) 
hire_lab_cult2 -806.2 -988.1 -118.9 1020 
 (4700) (2630) (2655) (2524) 
cattle -601.6 1214 1080 633.6 
 (1047) (775.7) (755.3) (616.3) 
sex_HH2 -539.2 -67.32 308.2 475.5 
 (4517) (2926) (2877) (2396) 
unmarried_HH -15978* -7872** -6371* -5320 
 (8400) (3825) (3537) (3812) 
widow_HH -4399 -2292 -1308 -172.1 
 (4412) (3007) (3129) (2471) 
edu2 226.3 1257 1082 1471 
 (2069) (1583) (1607) (1483) 
edu3 7355 9807** 8705* 7938 
 (4665) (4532) (4643) (5064) 
edu4 -1542 -1397 -847.7 574.1 
 (5426) (3596) (3979) (3487) 
edu5 26661** 23073** 21724* 29364** 
 (12762) (11464) (11688) (12521) 
edu6 45379*** 14165 9046 10241 
 (17300) (9798) (10537) (9896) 
social_gr3 5270 5096 12553 16434** 
 (9038) (7937) (8805) (8275) 
social_gr4 -3647 -2487 -2605 555.4 
 (5090) (3975) (4159) (3300) 
social_gr5 -6911 -8174* -7080* -4611 
 (4821) (4178) (4040) (3434) 
religion_nu1 -2380 987.2 1789 -1600 
 (6386) (3693) (3828) (3025) 
blocknum2 -1677 -4853 -5013 -3644 
 (4565) (3130) (3183) (2917) 
blocknum3 7145 8628 10698* 11035* 
 (5891) (5472) (5976) (5922) 
blocknum4 -4719 -4643 -4306 -3152 
 (3835) (3106) (3242) (2978) 
blocknum5 7968 -851.8 -1161 -1424 
 (8025) (3278) (3438) (3399) 
blocknum6 13092* 2050 1823 150.1 
 (7030) (3710) (3918) (3423) 
blocknum7 -2062 4540 -1349 -1478 
 (6452) (6387) (4939) (4895) 
blocknum8 5556 7323 5864 774.6 
 (5869) (5936) (6663) (5094) 
Constant 7407 5257 4223 4919 
 (6319) (4016) (3971) (3731) 
Observations 500 423 395 379 
R-squared 0.177 0.168 0.181 0.196 
Robust standard errors 
in parentheses 
    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Result-6: Impact of NREGS on Total Loan or debt (loan) with different combination of HH under 
IV estimation technique. 
VARIABLES With all HH With HH with 
Job-card 
With HH who 
 applied job 
With HH finally 
 got job  
     
nregpwork_days_inception 204.9 -43.86 -58.90 -79.21 
 (168.8) (105.3) (110.0) (111.8) 
landholding 7345*** 3747** 3981** 1667 
 (2414) (1619) (1615) (1541) 
irrigatedland -3116 -4537** -4020 862.8 
 (3051) (2217) (2710) (2543) 
hire_lab_cult2 -22.13 -1090 -360.7 539.4 
 (4778) (2763) (2787) (2577) 
cattle -945.8 1237 1127 719.1 
 (1336) (768.8) (775.7) (700.3) 
sex_HH2 -1702 68.96 460.6 793.5 
 (9720) (5471) (5370) (4804) 
unmarried_HH -10716 -8262 -7169 -7109 
 (16583) (10254) (9994) (9123) 
widow_HH -823.0 -2449 -1593 -808.4 
 (9365) (5141) (5170) (4665) 
edu2 3203 1004 667.5 683.2 
 (5687) (3204) (3074) (2805) 
edu3 12330* 9452** 8100** 7020** 
 (7268) (4108) (3968) (3490) 
edu4 6759 -1993 -1907 -1398 
 (9692) (5672) (5816) (5411) 
edu5 36049*** 22556*** 20863*** 28309*** 
 (11785) (7244) (7102) (6521) 
edu6 56227*** 13402* 7978 8103 
 (11584) (7418) (8092) (7430) 
social_gr3 5053 5071 12526** 16178*** 
 (8474) (4814) (5118) (4713) 
social_gr4 -7639 -2236 -2116 1531 
 (6184) (3480) (3569) (3356) 
social_gr5 -15299 -7677 -6115 -2735 
 (12249) (6452) (6503) (5978) 
religion_nu1 -3049 986.4 1760 -1685 
 (6397) (3700) (3709) (3443) 
blocknum2 -5375 -4609 -4551 -2624 
 (9585) (5215) (5069) (4673) 
blocknum3 13039 8145 9802* 9366* 
 (9995) (5840) (5925) (5429) 
blocknum4 -5014 -4662 -4305 -3110 
 (7068) (3920) (3838) (3449) 
blocknum5 14484 -1448 -2265 -3543 
 (9147) (5761) (5775) (5390) 
blocknum6 13814* 2013 1741 197.8 
 (7425) (4196) (4131) (3726) 
blocknum7 3810 4068 -2138 -3022 
 (10032) (5958) (6196) (5639) 
blocknum8 2802 7510* 6251 1724 
 (7790) (4311) (4309) (4046) 
Constant -5613 6343 6312 9112 
 (15336) (9342) (9634) (9212) 
Observations 500 423 395 379 
R-squared 0.119 0.166 0.177 0.172 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Result-7: Impact of NREGS on Total Savings (savings) with different combination of HH under 
OLS estimation technique. 
VARIABLES With all HH With HH with  
Job-card 
With HH who 
 applied job 
With HH finally  
got job  
     
nregpwork_days_inception -93.24** -40.49* -18.20 -21.61* 
 (41.75) (23.71) (12.03) (12.84) 
landholding 5797 4165 2693 2990 
 (3882) (3510) (3075) (3257) 
irrigatedland 25523 13918 -1004 -994.2 
 (16815) (15148) (1970) (2179) 
hire_lab_cult2 -2139 -8527 -6629 -7019 
 (8755) (5788) (5148) (5393) 
cattle -4095 1662 2544* 2613* 
 (3100) (2163) (1527) (1570) 
sex_HH2 9917 10072 17407* 17373* 
 (13706) (10290) (9482) (9368) 
unmarried_HH -30313 3634 8384 8042 
 (31959) (8662) (7754) (7712) 
widow_HH -1550 9726 20237* 20008* 
 (15235) (12020) (10958) (10754) 
edu2 -6334 132.8 2476 2352 
 (4600) (2730) (1931) (1930) 
edu3 -4669 1901 -1141 -1409 
 (8907) (3339) (1636) (1750) 
edu4 251.1 -9409 6037 6223 
 (21745) (12300) (5335) (5405) 
edu5 -34892** -4112 2278 3560 
 (17330) (7389) (3807) (4243) 
edu6 62799** 694.4 122.6 -592.0 
 (28112) (15312) (7964) (8050) 
social_gr3 -14600 -5505 -6763 -7762 
 (15145) (5852) (4987) (5430) 
social_gr4 -20879** -6315 -6849** -7592** 
 (9087) (4993) (3199) (3574) 
social_gr5 -15733* -9291 -9091* -9945* 
 (9319) (6230) (5167) (5526) 
religion_nu1 21289** 3693 6325** 7292** 
 (10103) (5984) (2541) (2940) 
blocknum2 -8300 -2331 -2724 -2285 
 (11495) (4014) (3583) (3411) 
blocknum3 -17220 -3146 -3345 -3634 
 (11214) (4342) (4035) (4213) 
blocknum4 -15042 -3216 -4630 -4749 
 (12550) (4864) (4548) (4579) 
blocknum5 925.0 -2425 -1830 -1303 
 (15850) (3339) (3159) (2983) 
blocknum6 14466 5197 -639.3 -44.48 
 (15895) (5970) (4368) (4224) 
blocknum7 -34397* -2535 5587 5634 
 (17730) (9707) (9789) (9773) 
blocknum8 -22890* -6704 -2884 -2303 
 (13561) (7835) (4160) (3891) 
Constant 6647 -5596 -16063** -16338** 
 (17268) (10044) (8061) (8128) 
Observations 500 423 395 379 
R-squared 0.215 0.208 0.229 0.238 
Robust standard errors 
in parentheses 
    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Result-8: Impact of NREGS on Total Savings (savings) with different combination of HH under 
IV estimation technique. 
VARIABLES With all HH With HH with 
Job-card 
With HH who 
 applied job 
With HH finally  
got job  
     
nregpwork_days_inception -494.5 -169.3 90.64 102.5 
 (342.1) (159.8) (88.20) (103.2) 
landholding 6400 4647* 2256* 2370* 
 (4891) (2457) (1295) (1423) 
irrigatedland 23670*** 12978*** -848.4 -718.8 
 (6181) (3363) (2172) (2348) 
hire_lab_cult2 -3480 -9282** -5814*** -6111** 
 (9680) (4192) (2234) (2379) 
cattle -3506 1830 2384*** 2451*** 
 (2707) (1166) (621.9) (646.6) 
sex_HH2 11906 11087 16894*** 16773*** 
 (19694) (8300) (4305) (4436) 
unmarried_HH -39317 736.8 11073 11421 
 (33599) (15556) (8012) (8423) 
widow_HH -7670 8559 21198*** 21209*** 
 (18973) (7799) (4145) (4307) 
edu2 -11428 -1745 3874 3839 
 (11522) (4861) (2464) (2590) 
edu3 -13180 -746.6 898.6 324.2 
 (14725) (6232) (3181) (3222) 
edu4 -13954 -13844 9605** 9945** 
 (19637) (8606) (4663) (4996) 
edu5 -50957** -7959 5179 5552 
 (23878) (10990) (5693) (6020) 
edu6 44235* -4984 3724 3444 
 (23470) (11253) (6487) (6860) 
social_gr3 -14228 -5691 -6671 -7279* 
 (17169) (7303) (4103) (4351) 
social_gr4 -14050 -4450 -8495*** -9434*** 
 (12529) (5280) (2862) (3098) 
social_gr5 -1379 -5589 -12344** -13486** 
 (24818) (9788) (5213) (5519) 
religion_nu1 22433* 3687 6423** 7452** 
 (12960) (5612) (2973) (3179) 
blocknum2 -1972 -515.6 -4283 -4212 
 (19420) (7912) (4064) (4315) 
blocknum3 -27305 -6739 -324.9 -483.4 
 (20251) (8860) (4750) (5013) 
blocknum4 -14537 -3358 -4630 -4828 
 (14321) (5946) (3077) (3184) 
blocknum5 -10226 -6862 1893 2698 
 (18533) (8739) (4630) (4976) 
blocknum6 13231 4927 -360.5 -134.5 
 (15043) (6365) (3311) (3440) 
blocknum7 -44444** -6043 8243* 8548 
 (20325) (9039) (4967) (5206) 
blocknum8 -18177 -5315 -4186 -4094 
 (15783) (6540) (3454) (3736) 
Constant 28925 2488 -23100*** -24254*** 
 (31072) (14173) (7723) (8505) 
Observations 500 423 395 379 
R-squared 0.176 0.180 0.145 0.134 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Appendix-4 Ordered probit regression results. 
Result:1 Impact of NREGS on Reduction of Stress related to joblessness: With all 
HH (Outcome-1: Stress reduced not at all; Outcome-2: Stress reduced in to some 
extent; Outcome-3: Stress reduced in great extent.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES Co-
efficient 
Mfx after 
outcome-1  
Mfx after 
outcome-2 
Mfx after 
outcome-3 
nregpwork_days_inception 0.00860*** -.0027472*** -.0002669 .0030141*** 
 (0.00149) (.00047) (.00021) (.00053) 
landholding 0.0632 -.0201997 -.0019623 .022162 
 (0.0875) (.02794) (.0031) (.03069) 
irrigatedland -0.288** .092116** .0089487 -.1010647** 
 (0.133) (.04271) (.00737) (.04617) 
hire_lab_cult2 -0.0838 .0269075 .0023166 -.0292241 
 (0.143) (.04615) (.00398) (.04965) 
cattle 0.0586 -.0187374 -.0018203 .0205577 
 (0.0452) (.01438) (.00196) (.01582) 
sex_HH2 -0.267 .0791313 .0186505 -.0977818 
 (0.287) (.07821) (.0317) (.10929) 
unmarried_HH 0.583 -.1477625 -.0760208 .2237833 
 (0.522) (.09726) (.11125) (.20748) 
widow_HH -0.262 .0884368 -.001551 -.0868858 
 (0.261) (.09266) (.01254) (.08159) 
edu2 0.144 -.0447343 -.0064686 .0512028 
 (0.145) (.04409) (.009) (.05248) 
edu3 -0.0271 .0087012 .0007453 -.0094464 
 (0.186) (.06028) (.0045) (.06474) 
edu4 0.170 -.051595 -.0099231 .0615181 
 (0.235) (.06766) (.02041) (.08769) 
edu5 0.331 -.0939576 -.0296712 .1236287 
 (0.379) (.09362) (.05519) (.14823) 
edu6 -0.305 .1055063 -.0070946 -.0984116 
 (0.361) (.13372) (.02903) (.10553) 
social_gr3 -0.0622 .0202201 .0012578 -.021478 
 (0.291) (.09624) (.00304) (.09893) 
social_gr4 -0.110 .0352629 .0033149 -.0385778 
 (0.167) (.05363) (.00551) (.05854) 
social_gr5 -0.0426 .0137907 .0009989 -.0147897 
 (0.269) (.08798) (.00446) (.09233) 
religion_nu1 -0.0567 .0178929 .0021625 -.0200553 
 (0.211) (.06575) (.00966) (.07532) 
blocknum2 -0.360 .1255459 -.0103282 -.1152177 
 (0.276) (.10245) (.02481) (.07904) 
blocknum3 -1.241*** .4617879*** -.1752414** -.2865465*** 
 (0.334) (.11684) (.08245) (.04105) 
blocknum4 -0.782*** .2770799*** -.0408241 -.2362558*** 
 (0.223) (.0826) (.0317) (.0561) 
blocknum5 -0.384 .132922 -.009223 -.1236989* 
 (0.250) (.09194) (.02092) (.0729) 
blocknum6 -0.908*** .3290466*** -.0715662* -.2574804*** 
 (0.226) (.08459) (.03995) (.0503) 
blocknum7 -1.029*** .3850847*** -.1276536* -.2574311*** 
 (0.266) (.09976) (.06231) (.04301) 
blocknum8 -0.766*** .2758255*** -.0507867 -.2250388*** 
 (0.230) (.08742) (.03706) (.05473) 
cut1 -1.153***    
 (0.387)    
Cut2 0.0220    
 (0.385)    
Observations 420    
Pseudo R-squared 0.1212    
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Result:2 Impact of NREGS on Reduction of Stress related to joblessness: With HH with Job card 
(Outcome-1: Stress reduced not at all; Outcome-2: Stress reduced in to some extent; Outcome-3: Stress reduced in great extent.) 
 
VARIABLES Co-efficient Mfx after 
outcome-1  
Mfx after 
outcome-2 
Mfx after 
outcome-3 
     
nregpwork_days_inception 0.00768*** -.0022802*** -.0005029** .0027831*** 
 (0.00148) (.00043) (.00021) (.00054) 
landholding 0.115 -.0340639 -.0075121 .041576 
 (0.0940) (.02787) (.0068) (.03409) 
irrigatedland -0.302** .0896884** .019779* -.1094674** 
 (0.150) (.04482) (.01171) (.05403) 
hire_lab_cult2 -0.0810 .0242059 .0050144 -.0292204 
 (0.147) (.04405) (.0088) (.05264) 
cattle 0.0496 -.0147149 -.0032451 (.01796) 
 (0.0456) (.01348) (.00325) (.01651) 
sex_HH2 -0.174 .0488486 .0157046 -.0645532 
 (0.312) (.0827) (.03629) (.11874) 
unmarried_HH 0.487 -.117142 -.0715508 .1886928 
 (0.498) (.09187) (.10721) (.19825) 
widow_HH -0.166 .0515483 .0069097 -.0584581 
 (0.288) (.09309) (.00643) (.09819) 
edu2 0.107 -.031093 -.0080526 .0391457 
 (0.148) (.04215) (.01274) (.05463) 
edu3 -0.0151 .004512 .0009619 -.0054739 
 (0.191) (.05702) (.01174) (.06875) 
edu4 0.108 -.0307987 -.0089033 .0397019 
 (0.245) (.06761) (.02459) (.09206) 
edu5 0.432 -.1072132 -.0593153 .1665285 
 (0.408) (.08123) (.08182) (.16223) 
edu6 0.120 -.0339471 -.0103674 .0443145 
 (0.423) (.11435) (.04568) (.15993) 
social_gr3 -0.153 .0478006 .0059164 -.053717 
 (0.297) (.09723) (.00489) (.10055) 
social_gr4 -0.0616 .01831 .0040094 -.0223194 
 (0.172) (.05111) (.01126) (.06228) 
social_gr5 -0.0151 .0045021 .0009477 -.0054498 
 (0.272) (.08144) (.01639) (.09782) 
religion_nu1 -0.0764 .0222578 .005719 -.0279769 
 (0.217) (.06184) (.01835) (.08009) 
blocknum2 -0.402 .1333835 -.0006085 -.132775 
 (0.283) (.10206) (.02079) (.08347) 
blocknum3 -1.262*** .4621744*** -.1552211* -.3069533*** 
 (0.344) (.12394) (.08571) (.04473) 
blocknum4 -0.830*** .281254*** -.0213237 -.2599304*** 
 (0.232) (.0839) (.02989) (.06044) 
blocknum5 -0.342 .1107645 .0051005 -.115865 
 (0.262) (.09088) (.01194) (.08194) 
blocknum6 -0.933*** .3255752*** -.0488958 -.2766794*** 
 (0.235) (.08713) (.03843) (.05491) 
blocknum7 -1.122*** .4115914*** -.1254685* -.2861228*** 
 (0.282) (.10546) (.06725) (.04438) 
blocknum8 -0.786*** .2708934*** -.0293565 -.2415369*** 
 (0.240) (.08934) (.03432) (.06005) 
cut1 -1.173***    
 (0.413)    
cut2 0.0355    
 (0.410)    
Observations 399    
PseduoR-squared 0.1073    
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Result:3 Impact of NREGS on Reduction of Stress related to joblessness: With HH who applied for 
Job. (Outcome-1: Stress reduced not at all; Outcome-2: Stress reduced in to some extent; 
Outcome-3: Stress reduced in great extent.) 
 
VARIABLES Co-efficient Mfx after 
outcome-1  
Mfx after 
outcome-2 
Mfx after 
outcome-3 
nregpwork_days_inception 0.00711*** -.0020121*** -.0006087*** .0026208*** 
 (0.00147) (.00041) (.00022) (.00055) 
landholding 0.121 -.0341399 -.0103273 .0444672 
 (0.0943) (.02669) (.00863) (.03478) 
irrigatedland -0.216 .061231 .0185223 -.0797532 
 (0.189) (.05388) (.01661) (.06959) 
hire_lab_cult2 -0.105 .0299897 .008477 -.0384667 
 (0.150) (.04311) (.01171) (.05452) 
cattle 0.0368 -.0104024 -.0031467 .0135491 
 (0.0459) (.01295) (.00408) (.01692) 
sex_HH2 -0.256 .0664293 .031044 -.0974733 
 (0.331) (.07773) (.05196) (.12927) 
unmarried_HH 0.421 -.0985458 -.0652685 .1638144 
 (0.495) (.09191) (.10599) (.19722) 
widow_HH -0.146 .0430694 .0094372 -.0525066 
 (0.303) (.09319) (.01377) (.1065) 
edu2 0.139 -.0382444 -.0136372 .0518815 
 (0.149) (.03981) (.0166) (.05601) 
edu3 -0.00452 .0012811 .0003845 -.0016656 
 (0.192) (.05454) (.01623) (.07077) 
edu4 0.0636 -.0176117 -.0060938 .0237055 
 (0.255) (.06884) (.02697) (.09574) 
edu5 0.417 -.0983792 -.0637561 .1621353 
 (0.408) (.07697) (.08621) (.16239) 
edu6 0.214 -.0554753 -.026247 .0817223 
 (0.492) (.11495) (.07781) (.19253) 
social_gr3 -0.107 .0315271 .0071806 -.0387077 
 (0.307) (.09385) (.01496) (.10858) 
social_gr4 -0.0687 .0194539 .0058629 -.0253168 
 (0.176) (.04996) (.01511) (.06497) 
social_gr5 0.00450 -.0012708 -.0003886 .0016594 
 (0.274) (.0774) (.0239) (.1013) 
religion_nu1 -0.0424 .0118655 .0038428 -.0157084 
 (0.222) (.06142) (.0213) (.08266) 
blocknum2 -0.464 .1503812 .004062 -.1544433 
 (0.289) (.10373) (.02184) (.0848) 
blocknum3 -1.415*** .5113456*** -.1751565* -.3361891*** 
 (0.362) (.12551) (.09151) (.04182) 
blocknum4 -0.899*** .2965101*** -.0113267 -.2851834*** 
 (0.239) (.08513) (.03016) (.06261) 
blocknum5 -0.413 .1307239 .0100746 -.1407985 
 (0.271) (.0935) (.0136) (.08399) 
blocknum6 -1.011*** .3463829*** -.0446678 -.3017151*** 
 (0.243) (.08893) (.04017) (.05579) 
blocknum7 -1.151*** .416558*** -.1170261* -.2995319*** 
 (0.288) (.10834) (.06862) (.04597) 
blocknum8 -0.886*** .299773*** -.0265795 -.2731935*** 
 (0.246) (.09071) (.03644) (.06036) 
cut1 -1.353***    
 (0.441)    
Cut2 -0.127    
 (0.436)    
Observations 387    
Pseudo R-squared 0.0997    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Result:4 Impact of NREGS on Reduction of Stress related to joblessness: With HH who finally got the Job. (Outcome-1: Stress reduced 
not at all; Outcome-2: Stress reduced in to some extent; Outcome-3: Stress reduced in great extent.) 
 
VARIABLES Co-
efficient 
Mfx after 
outcome-1  
Mfx after 
outcome-2 
Mfx after 
outcome-3 
nregpwork_days_inception 0.00652*** -.0017694*** -.0006555*** .0024249*** 
 (0.00148) (.0004) (.00023) (.00055) 
landholding 0.154 -.0417743 -.0154754 .0572498 
 (0.0952) (.02588) (.01035) (.03543) 
irrigatedland -0.251 .0682138 .02527 -.0934837 
 (0.192) (.05255) (.01978) (.07124) 
hire_lab_cult2 -0.135 .0372331 .0127391 -.0499722 
 (0.153) (.04275) (.01395) (.05626) 
cattle 0.0337 -.0091365 -.0033846 .0125211 
 (0.0463) (.01252) (.00478) (.01722) 
sex_HH2 -0.261 .0646056 .0354971 -.1001027 
 (0.334) (.07432) (.0571) (.13097) 
unmarried_HH 0.363 -.0830662 -.0580789 .1411451 
 (0.501) (.09383) (.10623) (.19955) 
widow_HH -0.179 .0514067 .0134693 -.064876 
 (0.308) (.09271) (.01585) (.10791) 
edu2 0.160 -.0419675 -.0183324 .0602999 
 (0.150) (.038) (.01938) (.05692) 
edu3 0.0245 -.0065966 -.0025384 .009135 
 (0.196) (.05251) (.021) (.0735) 
edu4 0.0705 -.0186293 -.0078806 .02651 
 (0.267) (.06855) (.03279) (.10128) 
edu5 0.395 -.0895428 -.0644492 .153992 
 (0.412) (.07518) (.08974) (.16419) 
edu6 0.175 -.0439665 -.0227892 .0667557 
 (0.498) (.11501) (.07944) (.19431) 
social_gr3 -0.172 .0497854 .0121525 -.0619378 
 (0.310) (.09522) (.01301) (.1075) 
social_gr4 -0.118 .0320129 .0117834 -.0437963 
 (0.180) (.04898) (.01819) (.06691) 
social_gr5 -0.0279 .0076643 .0026744 -.0103387 
 (0.275) (.07621) (.0251) (.1013) 
religion_nu1 0.00249 -.0006758 -.0002495 .0009252 
 (0.226) (.06137) (.02257) (.08394) 
blocknum2 -0.466 .1465094 .010885 -.1573945* 
 (0.292) (.10231) (.01892) (.08707) 
blocknum3 -1.442*** .515553*** -.1689232*** -.3466298*** 
 (0.364) (.12717) (.09305) (.04233) 
blocknum4 -0.874*** .2800233*** .0024057 -.2824291*** 
 (0.241) (.08459) (.02794) (.06503) 
blocknum5 -0.421 .1290669 .0158591 -.144926* 
 (0.273) (.09209) (.01201) (.08565) 
blocknum6 -0.980*** .3275941*** -.0287646 -.2988295*** 
 (0.245) (.08924) (.03832) (.05813) 
blocknum7 -1.161*** .4140184*** -.1068854 -.307133*** 
 (0.290) (.10952) (.06887) (.0472) 
blocknum8 -0.821*** .2683914*** -.0073821 -.2610093*** 
 (0.247) (.0895) (.03166) (.06421) 
Cut1 -1.402***    
 (0.446)    
Cut2 -0.151    
 (0.440)    
Observations 377    
Pseudo R-squared 0.0949 . .  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix: 5:  
Land Holding- Poverty-Economic status of HH- is there any nexus in the sample? 
1) To check the Land holding- Poverty direct nexus in the sample I will run a Probit regression of BPL on 
landholding along many other possible determinants of BPL. Here my response variable is BPL=1 if the HH lies 
Below Poverty Line (i.e. RHS score <=33) and BPL=0 if the HH lies Above Poverty Line (i.e. RHS score>=34). 
Then we will concentrate on sign, magnitude and statistical significance of the co-efficient on land holding on the 
response of probability of the HH to be a BPL HH. Result of the probit estimates are as follows. 
 
     Determinants of HH to be BPL HH. A Probit Estimation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Findings: From Probit regression it is found that the probability that a HH will be a BPL HH is falling by 0.08 percentage 
points with the rise in the land holding by 1 acre controlling for others. This result is statistically significant at less than 5% 
level of significance. This mean that with the fall in land holding or as landholding falls the chances of a HH to be a poor 
HH increases in a statically significant manner.  
VARIABLES Marginal effect on Prob.(bpl=1) X 
landholding -0.0852** .882439 
 (0.0386)  
cattle -0.0505** 1.48415 
 (0.0226)  
mpce_nregp -0.000212** 741.189 
 (9.00e-05)  
migrate_day_last1yr_hh -0.000312 45.1556 
 (0.000352)  
hhsize 0.00233 4.61383 
 (0.0169)  
Sex of Head of HH(sex_HH1 i.e. female as reference category)  
sex_HH2 0.0849 .907781 
 (0.0840)  
Social Group (caste) of the HH (here social_gr1&2 i.e. ‘General & 
Bramhin’ (higher caste) as the reference category 
 
social_gr3 0.177 .069164 
 (0.132)  
social_gr4 0.403*** .403458 
 (0.0795)  
social_gr5 0.380*** .048991 
 (0.133)  
Religion of the HH (here religion_nu2 i.e. Muslim as reference 
category 
 
religion_nu1 -0.196** .789625 
 (0.0992)  
Education of the Head of the HH (edu1 i.e. no education as the 
reference category)  
 
edu2 0.0243 .210375 
 (0.0743)  
edu3 -0.203*** .210375 
 (0.0738)  
edu4 -0.223** .106628 
 (0.0901)  
edu5 -0.297*** .057637 
 (0.0830)  
edu6 -0.103 .072046 
 (0.126)  
Observations 347  
Pseudo R2       0.2981  
Lo -237.59597  
L1 -166.75832  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix: 6:  
Land Holding- Poverty-Economic status of HH- is there any nexus in the sample? 
2) I ran separately OLS estimation of HH level economic variable i.e. monthly per-capita consumption expenditure 
adjusted after NREGS income, monthly per-capita income adjusted after NREGS income, log of HH total saving, 
and log of HH total outstanding debt. 
Determinants of HH level economic status -A OLS estimation 
 
Findings: Similarly we also got similar results with the OLS estimation in the second case that taking control of other 
factors as land holding increases by 1 acre the monthly per-capita consumption expenditure adjusted after NREGS income 
increases by Rs. 47.27, monthly income adjusted after NREGS income increases by Rs. 118.2 and savings increases by 
around 51% and all such increase are statistically significant. But for debt we got the desired sign i.e. as land holding 
increases outstanding loan or debt falls but such result is not statistically significant.  
Conclusion: Therefore, from these results one could argue more convincingly that land holding is a 
good predictor or proxy of HH poverty status and economic status. 
VARIABLES mpce_nregp mpi_nregp lnsavings lndebt 
landholding 47.27* 118.2** 0.512*** -0.147 
 (27.42) (58.30) (0.191) (0.148) 
cattle -4.514 -51.37 -0.0900 0.127 
 (19.35) (41.14) (0.135) (0.104) 
migrate_day_last1yr_hh 0.646** 1.875*** -0.000576 0.000371 
 (0.296) (0.628) (0.00206) (0.00159) 
hhsize -27.08* 30.95 0.190* 0.201** 
 (15.57) (33.10) (0.109) (0.0839) 
Sex of Head of HH(sex_HH1 i.e. female as reference category)  
sex_HH2 -14.40 -148.9 -0.115 0.871* 
 (92.19) (196.0) (0.643) (0.497) 
Social Group (caste) of the HH (here social_gr1&2 i.e. ‘General & 
Bramhin’(higher caste) as the reference category 
 
social_gr3 -97.94 -224.1 0.736 0.596 
 (125.2) (266.3) (0.874) (0.675) 
social_gr4 -231.9*** -384.1** 0.107 0.567 
 (79.09) (168.2) (0.552) (0.426) 
social_gr5 -302.7* -403.3 -0.0396 -1.065 
 (156.4) (332.5) (1.091) (0.843) 
Religion of the HH (here religion_nu2 i.e. Muslim as reference category  
religion_nu1 (hindu) 156.8* 382.4** 1.017 -1.411*** 
 (91.14) (193.8) (0.636) (0.491) 
Education of the Head of the HH (edu1 i.e. no education as the reference 
category)  
 
edu2 (Primary) 41.79 28.95 1.284** 0.791* 
 (76.54) (162.8) (0.534) (0.413) 
edu3 (Upper primary) 108.5 186.7 1.625** 1.241** 
 (91.84) (195.3) (0.641) (0.495) 
edu4 (Secondary) 175.0 563.5** 2.003** 0.415 
 (111.2) (236.4) (0.776) (0.599) 
edu5(higher secondary) 515.1*** 1094*** 3.557*** 0.691 
 (142.6) (303.1) (0.995) (0.769) 
edu6 (above HS) 1013*** 2062*** 4.488*** 0.478 
 (126.0) (268.0) (0.879) (0.679) 
Constant 671.5*** 376.0 0.772 5.739*** 
 (116.8) (248.4) (0.815) (0.630) 
Observations 500 500 500 500 
R-squared 0.253 0.248 0.152 0.076 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
